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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NEW MISSOURI EMPLOYER IMMUNITY STATUTE: ARE
MISSOURI EMPLOYERS STILL DAMNED IF THEY DO AND
DAMNED IF THEY DON’T?

“I have noticed,” Calvin Coolidge used to say, “that nothing that I never said
ever did me any harm.” In the field of employment law, Calvin Coolidge has a
lot of disciples, especially when it comes to job references.1

I. INTRODUCTION—THE NEED FOR A NEW LAW
It has long been the practice of employment lawyers in Missouri to caution
their clients to give only “name, rank, and serial number” when asked to
respond to reference requests.2 This advice stems from the Hobson’s choice
created for employers who fear that including too much information in a
reference will subject them to a suit for defamation or retaliatory discharge,
while including too little information will expose them to suits for
misrepresentation.3
Even as they shy away from divulging information about current or former
employees, Missouri employers are presumably following the national trend to
aggressively seek references when hiring new employees.4 At the same time,
1. Jack Kenny, Beware Giving References for Ex-Employees, 9 N.H. BUS. REV. 1, Feb. 14,
1997.
2. See New Missouri Reference Request Law—For What It’s Worth, 9 MO. EMP. L. LETTER
1 (Armstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, Mo.), June 1999, at 1. This practice is certainly not
unique to Missouri employment attorneys. See, e.g., Kenny, supra note 1 (quoting a local
employment attorney, “My advice is that the employer should confirm the dates of employment,
the nature of the position and that’s it.”).
3. See Jonathon Vegosen, Employment Law: Figuring Out Whether to Tell All or Zip Your
Lip on References, 19 CHI. LAW. 15, Sept. 1996 (“Employers providing information to
prospective employers frequently have found themselves the target of defamation suits. As a
result, many employers have adopted a ‘name, rank and serial number’ approach.”). See also
Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their “No Comment”
Policies Regarding Job References: A Proposal for Reform, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381,
1415-19 (1996) (discussing misrepresentation in the employment context); Susan Oliver,
Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can Employers Discard Their “No
Comment” and Neutral Job Reference Policies?, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 687, 689 (1999) (same);
infra notes 55-179 and accompanying text (discussing reference-based claims).
4. See SOCIETY OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JOB CANDIDATES AREN’T AFRAID
TO FIB (Press Release) (1998) (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.shrm.org/press/
releases/980130.html> (explaining that of the 854 human resource professionals who responded
to a reference checking survey conducted in July 1998, 89 percent check references for
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and in response to the increasing problem of workplace violence, courts are
beginning to hold employers responsible for the safety of their employees and
third parties.5 During the 1990s, approximately one million workers became
victims of assault in the workplace each year.6 In the same decade, there were
an average of twenty workplace homicides every week.7 Consequently, an
employer’s ability to obtain complete and accurate references is becoming
more important than ever.8
Applicants may be more likely to falsify information about their work
history or criminal past if they know that employers are reluctant to release
information about job performance.9 Once employees realize that their
detailed work history does not follow them from job to job, they may have less

professional positions, 85 percent for administrative positions and 81 percent for technical
positions). See also Peter Dalpe, Job References Can Be Elusive, NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 29,
1995, at D1 (reference checking has increased ten-fold since a 1979 scandal involving a
Washington Post reporter who faked her credentials); Kenny, supra note 1 (“[S]ome personnel
officials who follow non-disclosure policies say they, too, would like more information about job
applicants at their firms. ‘It’s frustrating,’ admitted [one human resource manager]. ‘I guess I’m
expecting people to give me information I won’t give anybody else.’”).
5. See William C. Martucci & Denise Drake Clemow, Workplace Violence: Incidents and
Liability on the Rise, EMP. REL. TODAY, Dec. 22, 1994, at 463. Note also that the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently held that a plaintiff who was awarded compensatory damages as a
result of sexual harassment by her supervisor might also be entitled to punitive damages because
her employer was “unmistakably aware” of the harasser’s previous behavior. Knowlton v.
Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999). The employer was aware of the
harasser’s propensities because he had already been accused of pinning another female employee
against a wall and making sexual advances. See id. at 1186-87. The company first fired the
harasser, but then rehired him at a sister company, gave him a larger office and an $8,000 raise.
See id. The Knowlton court cited the Supreme Court’s recent articulation of the standard for
punitive damages liability in sexual harassment cases, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 119 S.
Ct. 2118, 2120-23 (1999), as a basis for overturning the district court’s decision to grant the
employer’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. Knowlton, 189 F.3d at
1186. See also 164 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Aug. 25, 1999, at A-2 (discussing Knowlton).
6. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIOSH REPORT ADDRESSES PROBLEM
OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, SUGGESTS STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING RISKS (1996) (Press
Release) (last modified July 18, 1996) <http://www.cdc.niosh/violpr.html>.
7. See id.
8. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 735. See also Vegosen, supra note 3 (“[T]his ‘neutral
reference’ strategy can backfire. For example, inquiring companies have sued employers for
providing a ‘negligent reference’ when employers have failed to disclose that former employees
committed violent acts in the course of their employment.”). See also infra notes 150-79 and
accompanying text (discussing negligent misrepresentation/referral).
9. See SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4 (indicating that
almost half of the human resource departments surveyed said they knew a candidate who falsified
information about a criminal past); Rob Hotakainen, Pannier Case Calls Scrutiny of Teachers
Into Question, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 27, 1999, at 1A (explaining how a
teacher falsified his college transcript to gain a teaching job and is now standing trial for having
sex with a 15-year-old student).
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incentive to refrain from unacceptable behavior in the workplace.10
Additionally, the lack of available information regarding an employee’s
performance may lead some to assume a cavalier attitude toward their work.11
Yet, the reluctance of employers to give a detailed reference persists.12
Employers are aware of the need for information about an applicant, not
only to avoid potential liability resulting from hiring a violent employee, but
also to hire someone who is qualified to do the job.13 When information about
an applicant is unavailable prospective employers may turn to less reliable
sources, such as physical and psychological profiles, drug tests, or a
These avenues for seeking
prospective employee’s credit history.14
information may have little value as a predictor of an employee’s performance
and may raise employee privacy concerns.15
Thus, employers are not the only ones harmed by “no comment” or neutral
job reference policies.16 An employer’s refusal to give information when
asked for a reference can inhibit the job search for applicants with outstanding

10. See id. at 1429. See also Julie Forster, 25 States Adopt ‘Good Faith’ Job Reference
Laws to Shield Businesses from Liability, WEST’S LEGAL NEWS , July 2, 1996, available in 1996
WL 363324 (quoting South Carolina’s state director for the National Federation of Independent
Businesses, “The silence . . . quite honestly [helps] the bad employee because that person [knows]
he [can] go from job to job and [his] employers [won’t] say[] anything bad about [him].”);
Hotakainen, supra note 9 (relating the story of a teacher about to stand trial for having sex with a
15-year-old student after the teacher moved from job to job undeterred by prior misconduct in
other school districts).
11. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429.
12. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2. See also Julie M.
Buchanan, Threat of Defamation Lawsuits Limits Employee Information, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, July 22, 1999, at 15 (“All you can get these days is name, rank and serial number. In
other words, you get dates of hire, but no information pertaining to job performances, misconduct
or attendance. You can’t even find out whether the individual quit or was fired.”); Judi Russell,
Law Backs Employer Candor in Job Reference, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS., July 22, 1996, at 6
(“Job references, once the jewel in a résumé’s crown, have become about as useless to employers
as manual typewriters. Fearful of lawsuits . . . supervisors often limit their replies to a few terse
facts when asked about a current or former staff member.”).
13. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 692. See also Vegosen, supra note 3 (“This practice [of
providing neutral job references] inhibits the ability of prospective employers to obtain important
information about a potential employee’s competence.”).
14. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1428-29. See also Buchanan, supra note 12 (“The
lack of reliable information on a prospective employee . . . results in an undue emphasis being
placed on job interviews, which often are less objective types of candidate assessment.”).
15. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429. See generally Rochelle B. Esker, To Catch A
Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC. L.
REV. 251 (1994) (addressing employee privacy in the job reference context).
16. See Mike Maharray, Legislature 1997: Bill Allows More Leeway in Job References,
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wa.), Mar. 1, 1997, at B4 (quoting the owner of a local employment
agency, regarding employers’ nondisclosure policies, “This hurts employers and it hurts the good
employee who has earned a good reference.”).
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credentials.17 These exceptional employees are effectively prevented from
showing prospective employers their superior records when seeking to advance
their careers.18 Employers are less likely to hire an applicant for whom they
are unable to obtain information than they are to hire an applicant with a good
reference.19
Perhaps more troubling, the dearth of reference information has led some
employers to bypass restrictions established by a company’s human resource
department and seek information directly from an employee’s supervisor or coworkers.20 This approach may do little to insulate an employer from liability,
while, in some cases, it may subject employees to a biased review from the one
person in the workplace with whom they have a personality conflict.21
Moreover, in an effort to undermine restrictive reference practices, some
employers are engaging in a “wink and nod” approach.22 Under this approach,
employers attempt to convey their feelings about an employee by saying
something like “John was terrific, we hated to lose him, however, our official
policy is to say this and this.”23 Other employers may try to get their message
across by providing a neutral reference such as “yes, the person worked here”
in a resigned tone.24 These approaches are subject to misinterpretation by a
prospective employer; for example, a message that an employee requires closer
scrutiny may go undetected, while a highly muted message that an employee is
worthy of praise may be read as disapproval.25

17. See id. See also Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429 n.245 (quoting Paul W. Barada,
Check References With Care, NATION’S BUS., May 1993, at 54) (“Nothing puts up a red flag in
the mind of the prospective employer quicker than a reference who is unwilling to talk about a
former employee. If a former employer refuses to comment, the caller may assume it’s because
something is wrong with the applicant.”).
18. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1428-29. See also Forster, supra note 11 (quoting
South Carolina’s state director for the National Federation of Independent Businesses, “The
silence also hurts good employers [sic] because they aren’t getting the quality recommendation
that they worked hard to get.”); Kenny, supra note 1 (quoting a local human resource manager,
“We don’t even give out good references, just to be consistent. At this point we’re all playing the
game of ‘don’t say anything, even if you want to.’”).
19. See Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of
“Overdetterence” and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 45, 50 (1995) (citing a
1992 survey conducted by Paul Half International, Inc., an executive search firm, indicating that
forty-four percent of responding executives view a former employer’s no comment regarding a
former employee’s work record as a detriment to the applicant’s chances of being hired).
20. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429-30.
21. See Vicky Uhland, Escaping a Bad-Mouth Boss: How Do You Get a Decent Reference
from an Enemy?, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 20, 1999, at 1J.
22. Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1430.
23. Id. at 1430 n.252 (quoting Brooklyn-based employment attorney Jose Rivera).
24. Id. See also Uhland, supra note 21 (quoting a Littleton, Colorado employment lawyer,
“[M]uch can be implied by tone or inference.”).
25. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1430.
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In an effort to encourage employers to abandon their “no comment” and
neutral job reference policies, during its 1999 legislative session, the Missouri
General Assembly passed a law that attempts to balance the competing
interests of workers who need protection against arbitrary references, and
employers who need to make informed hiring decisions.26 The measure was
signed into law by Governor Mel Carnahan on July 13, 1999, as part of a bill
designed to make changes in the state’s unemployment compensation system.27
The new statute will be codified at section 290.152 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes.28
26. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 1.
27. See id.
28. At the time this Comment went to press, the new statute was not yet available in the
bound volume of the Missouri Revised Statutes or its supplement. Accordingly, throughout this
Comment, the new statute will be cited to Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Statutes. See MO. ANN.
STAT. § 290.152 (West Supp. 2000):
1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean:
(1) “Employer,” any individual, organization, partnership, political subdivision,
corporation or other legal entity which has or had in the entity’s employ one or more
individuals performing services for the entity within this state;
(2) “Prospective employer,” any employer, as defined in this subsection, to which an
individual has made application for employment, either oral or written, or forwarded a
resume or other correspondence expressing an interest in employment.
2. An employer may:
(1) Respond in writing to a written request concerning a current or former employee
from an entity or person which the employer reasonably believes to be a prospective
employer of such employee; and
(2) Disclose the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such
employer and the duration thereof; and
(3) Truly state for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily
quit such service.
The provisions of this section shall apply regardless of whether the employee becomes
employed by the prospective employer prior to receipt of the former employer’s written
response. The information provided pursuant to this section shall be consistent with the
content of any service letter provided pursuant to section 290.140 for the same employee.
3. The employer shall send a copy of any letter provided pursuant to subsection 2 of this
section to the current employee or former employee at the employee’s last known address.
The current or former employee may request from the employer a copy of the letter
provided pursuant to subsection 2 of this section for up to one year following the date of
such letter.
4. For purposes of this section, an employer shall be immune from civil liability for any
response made pursuant to this section or for any consequences of such response, unless
such response was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard for whether such response was true or false.
5. Any employer who violates the provisions of subsection 2 of this section shall be liable
for compensatory damages but not punitive damages.
6. Any letter issued pursuant to this section shall not be admitted as evidence in an
unemployment compensation claim.
Id.
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The statute gives an employer who voluntarily responds to a request for a
reference from a prospective employer “immun[ity] from civil liability,” unless
the response was “false and made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false.”29 Employers
who choose to respond pursuant to the statute’s dictates are also protected from
an award of punitive damages if they “[d]isclose the nature and character of
service rendered by such employee and the duration thereof; and . . . [t]ruly
state for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit
such service.”30 The statute requires that a copy of any response be mailed to
the current or former employee at the employee’s last known address.31 The
statute also allows an affected employee to request a copy of any response
made pursuant to the statute.32
According to law’s primary sponsor, Missouri State Representative Vicky
Riback Wilson, the new reference immunity statute represents a compromise
between the interests of employers and employees and serves a variety of
important purposes.33 First, the statute limits employers’ civil liability for
information provided in a reference.34 This protection encourages the freeflow of information between employers, allowing them to make informed
hiring decisions.35 Better-informed hiring decisions in turn may permit
employers to weed out dangerous employees and to protect the general public
as well as those in the workplace.36 The statute also protects employees by
attempting to assure that they are provided with the same information as their
prospective employers and that the information is job-related.37

29. Id. § 290.152.2, -.4.
30. Id. § 290.152.2.
31. Id. § 290.152.3.
32. See id. § 290.152.3.
33. See H.R. 441, 90th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999), available in 1999 MO H.B. 441
(Westlaw, MO-BILLS database) [hereinafter H.B. 441 of 1/18/99].
Missouri State
Representative Vicky Riback Wilson, Democrat, 25th Dist., was the primary sponsor of the bill,
which was also sponsored by Representative Carol Jean Mays, Democrat, 50th Dist. See id. The
bill was co-sponsored by Representatives Marsha Campbell, Democrat, 39th Dist.; Tim Van
Zandt, Democrat, 38th Dist.; Scott Lakin, Democrat, 33rd Dist.; and Emmy L. McClelland,
Republican, 91st Dist. See id. It was this bill that underwent major changes during the 1999
legislative session and was eventually incorporated, in total, into Senate Bill 32. S. 32, 90th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999) (enacted) (to be codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 290.152). See also
interviews with Missouri State Representative Vicky Riback Wilson (Oct. 25, 1999 & Feb. 23,
2000) [hereinafter Riback Wilson interviews] (notes on file with author).
34. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.
35. See id.
36. See id. According to one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Riback Wilson, the
Missouri home health care industry was one of the most active participants in lobbying for
passage of the bill. See id.
37. See id.
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Still, statutory immunity may help vindictive employers escape liability
resulting from defamatory references by placing a hurdle in the path of
employees seeking to challenge such references.38 On the other hand, failing
to protect employers who provide references in good faith makes it easier for
incompetent or dangerous employees to move from job to job.39 The new
Missouri reference immunity statute, or “shield law,”40 attempts to encourage
the voluntary exchange of reference information, but does not decrease the
chances that reasonable and defensible reference practices will be challenged
in court.41
Accordingly, even before the new statute became effective, attorneys for
Missouri employers were advising their clients not to “substantially depart”
from the “‘name, rank, and serial number’ mentality.”42 This Comment
explores the reasons why Missouri employers are likely to retain their current
practices and suggests ways in which the new statute might be clarified to
create additional incentives for employers to abandon their “no comment” and
neutral job reference policies.43

38. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1432. Under the new statute, if an employer is
found to have abused the qualified statutory immunity, an employee is purportedly limited to an
award of compensatory damages. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5. This limits an employee’s
common law defamation remedies, which include eligibility for an award of punitive damages
when the common law qualified privilege for references is overcome. See infra notes 108-19 and
accompanying text (discussing the common law qualified privilege that attaches to employment
reference in Missouri).
39. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1432.
40. Some commentators refer to reference immunity statutes as “shield laws” because they
are intended to “shield” an employer from liability for providing reference information. See, e.g.,
Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1388.
41. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the new law
“does not limit the currently available claims that can be made against an employer” in Missouri).
See also Uhland, supra note 21 (quoting Sandra Goldman, an attorney with Holland & Hart LLP,
explaining that immunity from civil liability is not the equivalent of immunity from suit).
42. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2.
43. Professor Bradley Saxton, who has written extensively on the subject of employment
references, believes the five most significant factors influencing employers to adopt restrictive
reference policies are:
(1) the fact that the most tangible benefits of open reference practices are realized by the
recipients, rather than the providers of reference information; (2) the fact that the expected
costs of open reference policies have typically been borne almost exclusively by the
providers of reference information; (3) the significant inconsistencies in the rules
potentially determining employers’ liability for employment references; (4) the absence of
a legal duty on the part of employers to respond to reference inquiries; and (5) the
‘American Rule’ requirement that even employers whose reference practices are
reasonable and responsible will pay significant attorney’s fees if forced to defend those
practices.
Saxton, supra note 19, at 113.
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One reason employers may be reluctant to rely on the new statute to
protect them from reference-based liability is because statutory immunity from
civil liability is not the same thing as immunity from suit.44 To illustrate the
extent of liability Missouri employers face, Part II of this Comment examines
some of the causes of action employees may utilize in challenging a
reference.45 Additionally, Missouri courts will likely look to the law that has
developed pursuant to these causes of action when construing the new statute.
Another reason Missouri employers may be hesitant to rely on the new
statute to protect them from reference-based claims is because a perception
exists that the law affords no more protection than employers already had
under the common law.46 Part III of this Comment examines the language,
scope, and possible implications of the new law to determine exactly what the
statute does and does not do.47 Part III also provides proposals for reforming
the statute to encourage employers to rely on the law to protect them from
liability when attempting, in good faith, to comply with the statute’s dictates.48
Part IV suggests that the new Missouri statute does not go far enough in
encouraging employers to provide detailed information when responding to
reference requests.49 This section includes a proposed statute that would place
a duty on employers to provide certain information in response to a proper
request for a reference.50 Even further, the proposed statute would place a
strictly limited, but affirmative “duty to warn” on a current or former employer
who provides a reference.51 This limited “duty to warn” would require a
former or current employer to inform a prospective employer if an employee
44. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 1, at 2; supra note 41.
45. See infra notes 55-179 and accompanying text (discussing causes of action commonly
brought to challenge an employment reference in Missouri, negligent hiring, and the emerging
cause of action or negligent misrepresentation or referral). Note that an allegedly defamatory
reference may also form the basis of a claim for intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage. See, e.g., Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 (Mo.
1993) (en banc). Under Missouri law this tort requires proof of:
(1) contract or valid business expectancy; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract or
relationship; (3) a breach induced or caused by defendant’s intentional interference; (4)
absence of justification; and (5) damages.
Id. at 316 (citing Community Title v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan, 796 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo.
1990) (en banc)). See also Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1412-14 (discussing the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage in the employment reference
context); Saxton, supra note 19, at 64-65 (same).
46. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2 (“Although the [new
statute] adopts a qualified privilege for employers, the courts had already done that, so it does not
actually create any new protections.”).
47. See infra notes 180-246 and accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. See infra notes 247-313 and accompanying text.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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has engaged in certain harmful or violent conduct in the workplace.52 As an
additional limitation, the duty to include admonitory information in a reference
would only arise if the employee was being considered for a position in which
he or she would pose a substantial risk of harm to third parties.53 Finally, the
proposal suggests that courts, in their discretion, be allowed to award
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party in any litigation brought pursuant
to the statute.54
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED REFERENCE-BASED CLAIMS
A.

Claims Brought by the Current or Former Employee
1.

The Missouri Service Letter Statute

Under the Missouri Service Letter Statute, certain corporate employees are
granted the right to request, and the employer is required to issue, a service
letter describing the nature, character and length of service rendered by the
employee, including the reason the employee was discharged or voluntarily left
employment.55 In sharp contrast, Missouri’s new reference immunity statute
extends immunity to references given only in response to a written request
from a “prospective employer,” and the employer’s response is completely
voluntary.56

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 247-313 and accompanying text.
55. The Missouri Service Letter Statute currently provides:
1. Whenever any employee of any corporation doing business in this state and which
employs seven or more employees, who shall have been in the service of said corporation
for a period of at least ninety days, shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of
such corporation and who thereafter within a reasonable period of time, but not later than
one year following the date the employee was discharged or voluntarily quit, requests in
writing by certified mail to the superintendent, manager or registered agent of said
corporation, with specific reference to the statute, it shall be the duty of the superintendent
or manager of said corporation to issue to such employee, within forty-five days after the
receipt of such request, a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager, setting
forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such corporation
and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee was
discharged or voluntarily quit such service.
2. Any corporation which violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be
liable for compensatory but not punitive damages but in the event that the evidence
establishes that the employer did not issue the requested letter, said employer may be
liable for nominal and punitive damages; but no award of punitive damages under this
section shall be based upon the content of any such letter.
MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1994).
56. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2, with MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
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The Missouri Service Letter Statute has been strictly construed to protect
only employees working in Missouri for a corporation doing business in
Missouri.57 Public employers or public entities, including municipalities and
municipal corporations, are not “corporation[s] doing business in the state”
within the meaning of the statute.58 In contrast, the new Missouri employer
immunity statute is applicable to nearly all employers in the state, both private
and public.59
The history of the Service Letter Statute demonstrates another sharp
contrast with the new law: the Service Letter Statute was designed to protect
the employee’s ability to move from job to job unhindered by the inability to
obtain a reference from his or her past employers.60 The new statute, however,

57. See Cordon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Kan. 1977)
(holding Service Letter Statute protects only those persons actually employed in Missouri);
Ramm v. Dempster Sys., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 114, 116 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (finding that an employee
originally hired in Missouri and who worked for sometime in Missouri was not an “employee”
for purposes of Service Letter Statute).
58. Krasney v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 765 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
Sprenger v. City of Springfield, 629 S.W.2d 493, 493-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Hunt v. St. Louis
Hous. Auth., 573 S.W.2d 728, 730-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
59. The Service Letter Statute is applicable to “an employee of any corporation doing
business in this state and which employs seven or more employees . . . .” MO. REV. STAT. §
290.140.1.
60. In the early case of Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., the Missouri Supreme Court put the
statute into historical perspective. 192 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1916). The court noted that at the time of
the statute’s passage, a custom existed among railroads and other corporations not to hire an
employee who could not produce a satisfactory written referral from his past employer. See id. at
389. The court stated:
This custom became so sidespread [sic] and effected such vast numbers of laboring
people it became a public evil, and worked great injustice and oppression upon large
numbers of persons who earned their bread by the sweat of their faces. The statute quoted
was enacted for the purpose of regulating that custom, not to destroy it (for it contained
some good and useful elements, enabling the corporations of the state to ascertain the
degree of the intelligence as well as the honesty, capacity, and efficiency of those whom
they wished to employ, for whose conduct they are responsible to the public and their
fellow employees), and thereby remedy the evil which flowed therefrom.
Id. In Cheek, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the Service Letter Statute was not an
infringement of a corporation’s due process rights or equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. The Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision and
stated:
What [is] more reasonable than for the Legislature of Missouri to deem that the public
interest required it to treat corporations as having, in a peculiar degree, the reputation and
well-being of their former employees in their keeping, and to convert what otherwise
might be but a legal privilege, or under prevailing customs a “moral duty,” into a legal
duty . . . .
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 546 (1922).
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is designed to encourage the voluntary free-flow of information among
employers.61
Although their basic purposes may differ, the two laws share some
features. Just as the Service Letter Statute currently purports to prohibit an
award of punitive damages based on the content of a service letter, the new
statute attempts to protect employers from punitive damage awards based on a
reference.62 Finally, the language of the new statute proscribing the contents
of any response made pursuant to the statute’s requirements tracks the
language defining the contents of a service letter.63 Thus, it is likely Missouri
courts will look to case law that has developed under the Service Letter Statute
to assist them in construing the new statute.
a.

The History of the Service Letter Statute

Missouri’s Service Letter Statute was first enacted in 1905.64 The statute
provided that a failure to issue a service letter was punishable by a fine not to
exceed five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period
not exceeding one year, or both.65 When originally enacted the Service Letter
Statute did not provide for civil liability; however, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the statute created a private cause of action for a failure to issue a
service letter that supported awards of both actual and punitive damages.66

61. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the primary sponsor’s remarks
regarding the purposes of the new statute).
62. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.2, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5.
63. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.2, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5.
64. The Act from which the statute was derived was entitled, “An act for the protection of
laboring men by requiring employing corporations to give letter showing service of employe [sic]
quitting service of such corporation, and providing for penalty for violation of this act.” 1905
Mo. Laws 178.
65. MO. REV. STAT. § 3020 (1909).
66. See Cheek, 192 S.W. 387. See also Ralph K. Soebbing, The Missouri Service Letter
Statute, 31 MO. L. REV. 505, 510-12 (1966). Note that at least one Missouri court decision
suggests that a letter issued pursuant to Missouri’s Service Letter Statute likewise could be used
to support a claim of retaliation pursuant to Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Missouri Human Rights Act. Blandin v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 4:96CV1130-DJS, 1997 WL
581562, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 1997). In Blandin, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri found that a plaintiff could rely on an employer’s failure to supply a
properly requested service letter to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See id. at *8-*9.
The Blandin court found, however, that “Marriott’s failure to provide plaintiff with a service
letter and the ‘vague harm’ which she alleges as a result [did] not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action.” Id. Nevertheless, it is clear the Blandin court left open the possibility that
failure to issue a service letter could form the basis for an action for retaliation under a number of
state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, thus creating a whole new class of litigation under
Missouri’s Service Letter Statute.
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In 1982, the Missouri Legislature revisited the language of the Service
Letter Statute.67 Presumably, a major purpose of the 1982 amendment was to
“limit punitive damage awards to cases where no letter is timely furnished, and
to preclude punitive awards based upon the content of the letter.”68 The
amendment did not preclude an award of punitive damages in cases where the
employer fails to issue a service letter at all.69
It appears, however, that the legislative attempt to limit punitive damages
to cases in which no service letter is issued has been largely unavailing.
Contrary to the legislative amendment, Missouri courts continue to hold that an
insufficient response or a response that falsely states the reasons for
termination is tantamount to a failure to issue a service letter and may entitle a
plaintiff to punitive damages.70
67. See Ryburn v. General Heating & Cooling, Co., 887 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). See also William C. Martucci & Mark P. Johnson, Recent Developments in Missouri:
Labor and Employment Law, 53 UMKC. L. REV. 509, 515 (1985). In its present embodiment, the
Service Letter Statute no longer makes it a criminal offense to fail to supply a service letter. See
MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.
68. See Ryburn, 887 S.W.2d at 607. The language limiting the award of punitive damages
under the amended Service Letter Statute was carried forward into the new reference immunity
statute. However, under the Service Letter Statute, an employer’s response is required if a proper
request is received, whereas under the new statute an employer’s compliance is voluntary. See
also infra notes 238-44 (discussing how the voluntary nature of the new statute creates a major
ambiguity because it is difficult to conceive of an award of punitive damages for failure to
comply with a statute that is voluntary).
69. See Martucci & Johnson, supra note 67, at 515. In Talbert v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri noted with concern that the
“Missouri General Assembly did not explain what would constitute a failure ‘to issue the
requested letter.’” 651 F. Supp. 1563, 1565 (E.D. Mo. 1987). The court noted that there are at
least four possible meanings to the phrase “failure to issue the requested letter” including:
1) the employer failed to issue a letter to the day of trial; 2) the employer issued a letter
that purported to be a service letter but, in fact, was not; 3) the employer failed to issue a
letter within the 45 day time period; and 4) the employer unreasonably delayed in issuing
a letter.
Id. The court held, using principles of statutory construction, that if an employer issues a letter
more than 45 days after it is requested, the employer has failed to issue a service letter and the
employee is entitled to seek punitive damages. See id. at 1565-66.
70. In Van Sickle v. Katz Drug Co., an employer testified regarding his failure to state the
true reason for an employee’s discharge, “I didn’t want to harm this young man. I didn’t want to
say anything in any way that would be harmful to him in obtaining other employment.” 151 S.W.
2d 489, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941). While commending the employer’s desire to protect the former
employee, the court found that the employer “had conscious knowledge” of his legal duty under,
and failure to comply with, the statute and that these facts supported an award of punitive
damages. Id. See also Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1067 (8th Cir.
1988) (“[A]n untimely service letter constitutes a complete failure to issue a service letter that
will support both compensatory and punitive damages.”); Stark v. American Bakeries Co., 647
S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (“Because the reason ‘your work was unsatisfactory’
would not enable plaintiff to meet and rebut severely impairing ‘facts’ stated by his former
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Litigation under the Service Letter Statute

The court determines the sufficiency of the employer’s response to a
proper request for a service letter as a matter of law.71 For example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that a service letter that included the cause of
the employee’s discharge, but not the duration of the employee’s employment
or the character of the employee’s service did not meet the requirements of a
proper service letter.72 Also, Missouri courts have held that service letters
stating that the employee was discharged for “unsatisfactory work” are too
vague to satisfy the requirements of the Service Letter Statute.73 Thus,
generalities regarding an employee’s termination will ordinarily not meet the
statutory requirements that a valid, clear, and true reason for an employee’s
discharge be given.74
One of the most litigated requirements of the Service Letter Statute
mandates that employers state the “true reasons” for an employee’s
discharge.75 As the Missouri Supreme Court explained in Labrier v. Anheuser
Ford, Inc.:

corporate employer, we conclude it is too vague to constitute a ‘cause’ for discharge under
§ 290.140, RSMO 1969.”); J & J Home Builders, Inc. v. Hasty, 989 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding company’s failure to sign service letter, even though on company letterhead,
constituted refusal to issue requested letter exposing company to punitive damage award); Hills v.
McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (failing to provide duration of
employment or character of service held equivalent to non-issuance of service letter); Ball v.
American Greetings Corp., 752 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (failing to state cause for
discharge constitutes refusal to issue the service letter and supports award of punitive damages).
But see Kincaid v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
employee not entitled to punitive damages where employer’s response is incomplete; not
complete failure to issue); Hendrix v. Wainwright Indus., 755 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding employee barred from seeking punitive damages because service letter provided
and employee challenged substance of letter).
71. See Newton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 700 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1983).
72. See Hills, 779 S.W.2d at 300.
73. Gloria v. University of Health Science, 713 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). In
Stark, the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that a service letter citing “unsatisfactory work” as
the reason for an employee’s termination, even if the work was unsatisfactory in some respect,
would not allow an employee to challenge any allegedly false statements that his work was not
satisfactory in other, possibly vital, respects. 647 S.W.2d at 123.
74. Cumby v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 524 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). See also
Gerharter v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 157 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (holding letter
which included dates of employment and was signed by the president of the corporation,
indicating that the employee’s services were satisfactory but no longer required insufficient to
comply with statute). But see Kincaid, 750 S.W.2d at 554 (employer’s response to a service letter
request that indicated the employee had resigned, rather than been terminated, was found to be
not so incomplete as to be equivalent to a failure to send a letter at all).
75. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
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There is a distinction between the reasons themselves being true and the
reasons given for discharge as being the actual ones for which the plaintiff was
dismissed. The statute only requires the latter . . . . Therefore, even though the
reasons stated may themselves be incorrect, they still may be the real reasons
the employer discharged its employee. In such a case, an employer satisfies its
obligations under the statute when it states the truth as to discharge reasons,
even though they may be incorrect.76

The Missouri Supreme Court outlined the burden of proof in a lawsuit
challenging the “true reasons” for discharge in Stark v. American Bakeries
Co.77 The Stark court cited with approval the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Western District of Missouri in Newman v. Greater Kansas City Baptist
and Community Hospital Association,78 which noted that a plaintiff’s burden
under the statute is a subjective one:
[T]he service letter gave as the cause of discharge: “Theft of personal property
on hospital premises.” At trial, plaintiff produced evidence that she was not
guilty of theft. Reversing judgment for plaintiff, the court opined, “. . . [sic]
the evidence that [plaintiff] did not steal proves merely that the statement that
she did steal was false, not that the reason stated for discharge was false. In
fact, the evidence allows no inference other than that she was terminated
because . . . the hospital believed she stole. There was no proof that the reason
given was a foil for a true but undisclosed cause. The want of such evidence
amounted to a lapse to prove a submissible cause of action under § 290.140.”79

To avoid a directed verdict, a plaintiff trying to establish that an employer
failed to state the true reason for discharge “need not prove the true reason for
his discharge but must cite substantial evidence that the stated reason is not the
true reason for his discharge.”80
c.

Damages Under the Service Letter Statute

Missouri courts have repeatedly found that the failure of an employer to
issue a service letter when requested entitles the employee to nominal damages
even absent proof of actual injury.81 In order for an employee to recover actual
damages under the statute, the employee must prove:

76. 621 S.W.2d 51, 57 n.2 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
77. 647 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
78. 604 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
79. Stark, 647 S.W.2d at 124 n.7 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 124 n.5 (citations omitted).
81. See Thompson v. Skelgas, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See also
Herberholt v. dePaul Community Health Ctr., 625 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (citing
Heuer v. John R. Thompson Co., 251 S.W.2d 980, 985 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952)) (“The failure to give
a proper service letter constituted an invasion of plaintiff’s legal rights and without proof of any
damages whatever entitled plaintiff to a verdict for nominal damages.”).
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(1) that on or about an approximate date the plaintiff was either refused
employment or hindered in obtaining such employment; (2) that the refusal or
hindrance was caused by the absence or inadequacy of the service letter; (3)
that the position the plaintiff had difficulty in obtaining was actually open; and
(4) the salary rate of that position.82

The standard under which a Missouri plaintiff may be entitled to an award
of punitive damages was defined by the Missouri Supreme Court in Burnett v.
Griffith as “conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive
or reckless indifference to the rights of others.”83 Courts have upheld the
Burnett standard as the appropriate standard for submission of punitive
damages under the Service Letter Statute.84
In Ryburn v. General Heating & Cooling, Co., the Missouri Court of
Appeals discussed the level of “outrageousness” necessary to support an award
of punitive damages in a service letter case.85 The Ryburn court rejected the
argument of the defendant employer that the term “outrageous,” as used in
Burnett, was equivalent to the degree of outrageousness needed to support a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.86 The Ryburn court stated:
It may seem anomalous that the standard for imposition of punitive damages
might be a lower degree of outrageousness than the standard to award
compensatory damages in a tort action of outrage. However, the reluctance of
the courts to open the floodgates of claims for the tort of outrage have caused
the courts to maintain a very high threshold for such claims . . . .87

The standard for a punitive damage award in a service letter action requires
proof that would support a finding of outrageousness “based upon a wanton
mental state—a knowing and conscious disregard of the right or the welfare of
another.”88 Accordingly, a defendant’s reckless indifference to the rights of

82. Herberholt, 625 S.W.2d at 622-23 (citing Rotermund v. Basic Materials Co., 558
S.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)). See also Grasle v. Jenny Craig Weight Loss Centres,
Inc., 167 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (Fact that employee asked for service letter by
prospective employer, standing alone, insufficient to prove actual damages. There must be a
showing that the employer actually held the service letter against the plaintiff); Labrier v.
Anheuser Ford, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
83. Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
84. See Ryburn, 887 S.W.2d at 608 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted) (“The parties
in this case have assumed, and we assume, that a claim of violation of the service letter law is
equivalent to an intentional tort for purposes of the appropriate standard for submission of
punitive damages.”); Hills v. McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780,787 (Mo. 1989)) (“While the Burnett decision
involves punitive damages in cases of intentional torts, we find it analogous to the statutory
imposition of punitive damages.”).
85. 887 S.W.2d at 608-09.
86. Id. at 608.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 609.
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others will support a finding of outrageousness and hence, an award of punitive
damages to a service letter plaintiff in Missouri.89
Courts may likely apply the standards governing an award of damages
under the Service Letter Statute when construing the new employer immunity
law. The language describing the contents of any response made under the
new law mirrors the language of the required contents of a service letter.90 The
new statute also borrows language from the standards used by Missouri courts
in deciding common law defamation claims.91 Thus, the courts may rely on
common law defamation jurisprudence to determine when the privilege
bestowed by the new statute has been overcome, entitling an employee to
damages for a defamatory reference.
B.

Defamation in the Employment Context

While retaining the common law characteristics of libel and slander,
Missouri courts consider both causes of action under the single tort label of
defamation.92 Additionally, Missouri courts no longer distinguish between per
se93 and per quod94 defamation.95 Under Missouri law, an employee wishing
89. See id. See also J & J Homebuilders, Inc., v. Hasty, 989 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999). In J & J, the court stated:
[T]he jury could reasonably conclude that failing to sign the letter, sending the letter to
her former address two weeks after it was prepared and providing an erroneous date of
termination was outrageous because of J & J’s reckless indifference [to] the rights of Ms.
Hasty under the statute. The evidence shows that [Defendant’s Vice-President] spoke
with her attorney regarding the service letter and was cognizant of the requirements of the
service letter statute and that she did not review or sign the letter before it was sent. In
entering its verdict, the jury did not believe the deficiencies in the letter were inadvertent
or mistakes as J & J contends. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in submitting the
issue of punitive damages to the jury.
Id. at 617.
90. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2, with MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
91. Compare “[f]or purposes of this section, an employer shall be immune from civil
liability for any response made pursuant to this section . . . unless such response was false and
made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether such response was
true or false,” MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4, with the common law standard for overcoming the
qualified privilege that attaches to employee references in Missouri which requires that plaintiff
prove “the falsity of a statement and knowledge of such falsity (or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s
rights without knowledge of whether it was true or false) . . . .” Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547
S.W.2d 830, 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 489 S.W.2d 197, 204
(Mo. 1972)).
92. Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Henry v.
Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
93. At early common law, four categories of false statements were considered slander per se
including: “that the plaintiff was guilty of a crime, afflicted with a loathsome disease, or unchaste,
as well as false statements that concerned the plaintiff’s ability to engage in his or her occupation
or business.” Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). If
a plaintiff was alleging slander per se, the plaintiff did not have to plead damages because
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to challenge an allegedly defamatory reference must prove: (1) the employer
made a statement of fact, (2) the statement was of and concerning the plaintiff,
(3) the statement was false, (4) a third person heard or read the statement (also
known as the “publication” element),96 (5) the plaintiff’s reputation was
injured, and (6) the defendant was at fault.97 In order for a statement of fact to

damages were presumed. See id. Libel per se “referred to a statement whose defamatory nature
was apparent upon the face of the publication . . . .” Id.
94. At early common law, slander per quod encompassed words which were not actionable
as slander per se and a plaintiff was required to both plead and prove “special damages.” Nazeri,
860 S.W.2d at 308. Special damages were those that were capable of being calculated in dollars,
such as the loss of marriage, employment, income, profits or even gratuitous hospitality. Carter
v. Willert Home Prods., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Extrinsic facts were necessary in order to label a defamatory statement as libel per quod and proof
of special damages was also required. Id. at 509 & n.1.
95. In Nazeri, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
Although it is clear that respondent’s remarks were defamatory, attempts to characterize
them as per se or per quod appear more artificial than real. Unfortunately, the result of
the classifications may have a very real impact more far-reaching than justified. In one
case the jury is free to presume damages. In the other the jury is precluded from awarding
actual damages unless special damages are proven. . . . We hold that in defamation cases
the old rules of per se and per quod do not apply and plaintiff need only to plead and
prove the unified defamation elements set out in MAI 23.01(1) and 23.01(2). In short,
plaintiffs need not concern themselves with whether the defamation is per se or per quod,
nor with whether special damages exist, but must prove actual damages in all cases.
860 S.W.2d at 312-13.
96. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 69-70.
97. See Mark P. Johnson & Joseph W. Miller, An Overview of Libel Law in Missouri, 52 J.
MO. B. 210, 211 (1996) (citing Moore v. Credit Info. Corp. of Am., 673 F.2d 208 (8th Cir.
1982)); Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 312-13. To recover at early common law, a defamation plaintiff
needed only to prove the publication of a false and defamatory statement; the intent or “fault” of
the defendant was not an issue. John Bruce Lewis, et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A
Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54 MO. L. REV. 797, 816 (1989). The landmark
case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) marked a turning point in the law of
defamation. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the principles of freedom of
speech with defamation law developed by the states by requiring that “actual malice” be proven
before a public official can recover damages for defamation:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless the plaintiff proves the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ – that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80. A decade later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974), the
Court distinguished between public and private defamation plaintiffs, and found that the “actual
malice” standard should apply to public figures and officials, while the standard for private
litigants was left to the states to define “so long as they do not impose liability without fault.”
The standard of fault for private figures announced in Gertz has been called into question by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985). Dunn has been read to limit the fault requirement in Gertz to plaintiffs that are private
figures when the defamatory statement does not involve a matter of public concern. See Lewis,
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be defamatory, it must tend to “harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from desiring to
associate or deal with him.”98
The initial determination as to whether a statement is defamatory is a
question of law decided by the court.99 When determining whether a statement
is defamatory, Missouri courts consider the statement in context, not in
isolation.100 Once the court determines that a statement is defamatory, the
court examines whether one or more privileges or defenses protect the
defendant from liability.101
a.

Common Law Defenses to a Defamation Claim

Privileged communications are divided into two general categories:
communications that are absolutely privileged102 and those that are qualifiedly
or conditionally privileged.103 If a communication is absolutely privileged,
even intentional false statements are immune from suit, while a qualifiedly or
conditionally privileged communication is immune only if the privilege is not
abused and the defamatory statements are published in good faith and without
malice.104

supra, at 817. At least one commentator has noted that Dunn does not significantly impact
defamation claims in the workplace because most employees are private individuals and
references are not normally of public interest. See id. Thus, fault remains a requirement in most
reference-based claims. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 70-71.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Comment d to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 explains that a communication can be defamatory even absent actual
harm, so long as the statement has a general tendency to cause such harm. See id. § 559 cmt. d.
Thus, there is a difference in determining whether a communication is defamatory and whether
damages can be recovered. See id.
99. See Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
100. See Buller v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). See also
Balderree v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309, 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that examined in
context the only reasonable inference from defendant’s statement that plaintiff “propositioned”
members of the contractor with whom the employer did business was that plaintiff had “sexually
propositioned” such members. According to the court, “[a]ny other holding would ignore today’s
vernacular.”).
101. See Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 380.
102. When a statement is absolutely privileged, the defense of privilege is generally not
required to be set forth in the answer and may be raised by way of a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel & Slander § 457 (1995).
103. A qualified or conditional privilege must be pleaded and proved; unless it is
affirmatively disclosed by the complaint, or the defense, as an issue in the case. See 50 Am. Jur.
2d Libel & Slander § 457 (1995). Failure to raise the qualified privilege as a defense generally
constitutes a waiver of the defense. See id. See also Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 166 S.W.2d 1065,
1068 (Mo. 1942) (citation omitted) (“The difference in the two classes of privilege is ‘that malice
destroys the one and does not change the other.’”).
104. Laun, 166 S.W.2d at 1068.
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Absolute immunity is generally confined to a few situations where there is
an obvious policy in favor of permitting complete freedom of expression,
without any inquiry as to the defendant’s motives.105 Absolute privilege is
based upon the public policy of freedom of speech and is generally limited to
judicial, legislative or executive proceedings.106 The privilege is sometimes
extended “to occasions where the communication is provided for and required
by law.”107
Communications concerning the character of an employee or former
employee are generally qualifiedly privileged.108 For the privilege to attach,
the communication must be made in “good faith” concerning a subject in
which both parties have a common duty or interest.109 Even a false defamatory
statement in a reference enjoys a qualified privilege under Missouri law if it is
made in good faith and the employer reasonably believes it to be true.110

105. See id. See also Wright v. Over-The-Road & City Transfer Drivers, Helpers, Dockmen
and Warehousemen, 945 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
106. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1966).
107. See State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). These
“other occasions” have been held to include proceedings that are “quasi-judicial” in nature. Id.
108. See Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting 50
Am. Jur. 2d Libel & Slander §§ 195, 273 (1995)). The Missouri Supreme Court has also held that
information given to a loan company investigating an employee is subject to a qualified privilege.
In Carter v. Willert Home Prods., the Supreme Court held:
Although Civil Finance Company was not a prospective employer of plaintiff, it was
about to enter into a business relationship with plaintiff, and its interest in the information
was no less substantial that than [sic] of the prospective employer in Cash. We believe
that the statements made in this case are likewise, as a matter of law, qualifiedly
privileged.
714 S.W.2d 506, 513 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
109. Cash, 547 S.W. 2d at 833.
110. In Washington v. Thomas, 778 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), the resident
manager of an apartment complex sued the corporation that owned the apartment complex for
defamation after the complex allegedly published documents “accusing plaintiff of threatening to
do bodily harm with a loaded weapon to his superiors.” 778 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989). The court stated:
Lack of personal knowledge is no bar to the relating of all relevant information regarding
a former employee to one who has a definite interest [in] providing it is done in good
faith, i.e. without serious doubt as to the truth of the information. Proof of falsity is not
proof of malice, nor is malice shown by the defamatory nature of the charges nor by the
failure to investigate.
Id. at 799 (citations omitted). In Carmichael v. Wiesemann, 738 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987), the employer told customers that the employee had been fired for stealing and the
employee sued for slander. See id. at 887. The employee had failed a lie detector test, but denied
stealing. See id. at 879-80. The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant realized the statement in which he said that the plaintiff
“had stolen or that he was fired for stealing was false” or that the defendant “subjectively
entertained serious doubt as to the truth of such statements.” Id. at 881.
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To overcome the qualified privilege that attaches to letters of reference in
Missouri, the employee has the burden of proving express malice.111 A jury
then determines whether the showing of malice is sufficient to overcome the
qualified privilege.112 Missouri’s approved jury instructions on libel and
slander, however, do not contain the term “malice,”113 instead jurors are
directed to determine whether the statement was made with “knowledge that it
was false, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false at a time
when they had serious doubt as to whether they were true . . . .”114 When the
evidence shows that the defamatory statement was published “for a motive
inconsistent with the principles that gave rise to the qualified privilege,” malice
may be present.115
The common law qualified privilege can be overcome not only by a
finding of “malice,”116 but also by what is termed “excessive
dissemination.”117 The “excessive dissemination” exception might exist, for
example, if publication is made “to persons other than those to whom the
communication is important and thus privileged.”118 Other ways in which the

111. Washington, 778 S.W.2d at 834.
112. Snodgrass v. Headco Indus., Inc., 630 S.W.2d 147, 153-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing
Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966)).
113. In Snodgrass, a defendant in a slander case challenged Missouri’s Approved Instructions
(MAI), claiming they failed to properly prescribe the plaintiff’s burden when the communication
is qualifiedly privileged. 630 S.W. 2d at 154. The MAI on libel and slander track the language
of the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1965) in defining “actual
malice.” Snodgrass, 630 S.W.2d at 154. The drafters of the MAI were apparently cognizant of
the considerable confusion in case law regarding the proper terminology for the type of malice
necessary to overcome a qualified privilege, alternately referred to by the courts as “actual
malice,” “express malice,” “legal malice,” “malice in fact,” and “malice in law.” Id. The MAI
contains but one term “malice” which has only one definition, i.e., “the doing of a wrongful act
intentionally without just cause or excuse.” Id. at 154-55 (quoting MAI 16.01). Because the New
York Times standard is used in the libel and slander instruction, there is no need for a jury in
Missouri to find either “legal malice” or “actual malice” to award punitive damages. Snodgrass,
640 S.W.2d at 155. The notes on use to the MAI for libel and slander provide that MAI 4.16
should be used as a damage instruction. See id. at 155. This instruction allows an award of
punitive damages if the jury finds such damages “will serve to punish the defendant and deter him
and others from like conduct.” Id. at 155 (quoting MAI 4.16) (internal quotations omitted).
114. Snodgrass, 630 S.W.2d at 154 (citing MAI 23.10(2)). Note the similarity between this
language and the language of section 4 of the new statute: “an employer shall be immune from
civil liability for any response . . . unless such response was false and made with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false.” MO. ANN.
STAT. § 290.152.4.
115. Snodgrass, 630 S.W.2d at 154.
116. Id.
117. Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
118. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 73. See also Rice, 919 S.W.2d at 244 (citing Hellesen v.
Knaus Truck Lines, 370 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. 1963)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
604 (1977).
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qualified privilege may be defeated include a showing that the employer
published information about the employee to a person who did not have an
important stake or interest in the information; that the published statements
were not limited to a necessary purpose; or that such statements were made on
an improper occasion.119
In addition to the common law qualified privilege, an employer has
additional defenses against a defamation claim. Truth may always be asserted
as an absolute defense to a defamation action.120 The Missouri Constitution
provides that “in all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof
may be given in evidence . . . .”121 This tenet remains intact even if the
reference is made with express malice.122
Consent is also an absolute defense to defamation.123 The consent defense
typically applies when, at the employer’s request, an employee has executed a
waiver of claims based upon any reference or the employee has given written
consent to an employer to release pertinent information to prospective
employers.124 The consent defense may also be applicable when an employee

119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 603-605A (1977).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) (“One who publishes a
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.”).
See also Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 642 (Mo. 1966) (citing Warren v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co.,
336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404, 412(1) (1934)) (“Where all the facts stated are completely true, no
defense of privilege is necessary since the truth is always a defense to libel.”).
121. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 8. In Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) ,
plaintiff’s supervisor held an employee meeting after plaintiff was suspended for three days for
sexual harassment. See id. at 242. On appeal, Rice asserted that he was not guilty of sexual
harassment and that any statements to the contrary made by his supervisor at the employee
meeting were false, and thus actionable. See id. at 243. The Supreme Court disagreed:
First, Rice asserts that his supervisor stated that ‘there had been an investigation of
charges of sexual harassment of female State Farm employees by [Rice] and that as a
result of said investigation [Rice] was being transferred.’ All parties agree that there was
indeed an investigation and Rice was transferred. Truth is an absolute defense to the first
statement alleged.
Second, Rice points to one employee’s affidavit stating that the supervisor told the
employees at the meeting that ‘a sexual harassment investigation had been concluded and
two individuals were found guilty of such conduct.’ Rice asserts that he was not guilty
and thus, was defamed by the statement. Clearly, the statement was true in the sense that
State Farm management, after an investigation, believed Rice had committed sexual
harassment.
Id. at 243-44.
122. See Cook v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 145 S.W.2d 480, 490 (Mo. 1912).
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977). See also Turner v. Gateway
Transp. Co., 569 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines,
Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1966)).
124. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1404.
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contractually agrees to follow certain policies related to his discharge or
separation from employment.125
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an
absolute privilege for statements of opinion regardless of whether the
statement is made maliciously or insincerely.126 Additionally, public entities

125. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 61-63. In Turner v. Gateway Transportation Co., 569
S.W.2d 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), a union member’s discharge letter was automatically sent to the
Motor Carrier Council of St. Louis (Council), the organization that handled grievances for
Gateway. See id. at 359. The union member argued that he had been libeled when his employer
published the letter to the Council. See id. at 360. The court found that Turner was bound by the
union contract which provided that discharge letters be forwarded to the Council. See id. The
court held: “plaintiff consented to the procedures followed in this case, and the contents of the
discharge letter properly sent pursuant to those procedures were absolutely privileged.” Id.
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Only statements of fact, as opposed to statements of opinion,
are actionable as defamatory. See Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(“The fact that it might be eventually established in court that the persons accused in these
statements indeed engaged in fraudulent or illegal conduct does not make the statements
verifiable; it simply means that the prediction issued in the statements proved accurate.”).
Statements that contain a mixture of fact and opinion are also actionable. See Johnson & Miller,
supra note 97, at 211. Missouri courts look at the “totality of the circumstances” when
determining whether a statement is fact, mixed opinion, or pure opinion. See Henry v.
Haliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 788 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). For example, an employee of a
construction firm sued the project owner for defamation for statements made in a settlement letter
and a letter mailed to the state Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors.
Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 378-79. The statement in the settlement letter was prefaced with the words
“[i]t is my position.” Id. at 380. The court held that it would be impossible to construe the phrase
“it is my position” as “positing a verifiable proposition, and verifiability is the crux of the
fact/opinion distinction in defamation law.” Id. The court also found that the defamatory
statement in the settlement letter was judicially privileged and not actionable. See id. at 381.
This distinction between fact and opinion may assist in protecting a Missouri employers’
assessment of an employee’s work performance. See Bernard E. Jacques, Defamation in an
Employment Context: Selected Issues, WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999: WHAT
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 721, 728 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 600, 1999); Murray Schwartz et al., Claims for Damage to an Employee’s
Reputation and Future Employment Opportunities, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999:
WHAT PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 745, 763-64 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 600, 1999) (“[U]nless the employee is able to assert that
the statement was based on facts and was not just the opinion of the supervisor, the employee’s
claim for defamation will fail.”). But see Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303,
314 (“The remarks pleaded in the petition consist of outright expressions of fact and ostensible
expression of opinion which very strongly imply underlying facts.”); Benner v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 813 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991):
The statement with which defendants are charged – that Deana Benner released
confidential information – could be in its context a statement of fact; it implies that Deana
Benner disclosed information about George Benner’s condition which she had gained
from the medical files in Med Clinic. The alleged statement meets the test . . . ; it clearly
“implies an assertion of objective fact.”
Id. at 20 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
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may be able to defend against a claim of defamation on sovereign immunity
grounds.127 Sovereign immunity generally protects public entities from suit in
tort, in the absence of an express statutory waiver.128
Although a number of defenses are available to employers who provide an
accurate assessment of an employee’s performance, many employers are still
reluctant to part with their “no comment” or neutral job reference policies.129
Yet under the doctrine of self-compelled publication, an employer may be held
liable for defaming an employee even if he says nothing at all.
b.

A New Twist on an Old Claim

Until relatively recently, the publication element of the common law tort of
defamation required the defendant to have “publicized” the defamatory
statement to at least one person in addition to the plaintiff.130 The publication
requirement is thus based on a principle of common sense; it is simply not
possible to harm the plaintiff’s reputation if only the plaintiff heard, read or
saw what the defendant communicated about the plaintiff.131
Despite this “common sense” policy, an emerging doctrine currently
adopted by a minority of jurisdictions, including Missouri, allows a relaxation
of the traditional publication requirement in the employment context.132 The
doctrine of “compelled self-publication,” permits a plaintiff employee to
satisfy the publication element in a defamation action if the employee proves
that he or she was wrongfully dismissed and was subsequently compelled to
inform prospective employers of the reason for the dismissal.133 In Missouri to
make out a claim of compelled self-publication defamation, a plaintiff must
show:
(1) that the employer stated a false reason for termination; (2) that the
employer knew the statement was false or had serious doubt about its truth
when it was made; (3) that the employer intended or had reason to suppose that
the statement would be disclosed to a third party; (4) that the statement tended
to expose the employee to contempt within his profession; (5) that the

127. See MO. CONST. art. IX, § 9a.
128. See Krasney v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 765 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
129. See supra notes 2-25 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ reluctance to
respond to reference requests).
130. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation In The Employment Discharge Context: The
Emerging Doctrine Of Compelled Self-Publication, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 227, 242 (1998).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 230, 243-44 & n.79.
133. See Charles S. Murray, Jr., Compelled Self-Publication in the Employment Context: A
Consistent Exception to Defamation Requirement of Publication, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295,
297 (1988).
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statement was communicated to prospective employers; and (6) that the
employee suffered actual damages to his reputation.134

To prove actual damages in the context of a compelled self-publication
defamation action, a Missouri employee must demonstrate a nexus between the
employer’s false statement and the loss of a job opportunity.135 The sole fact
that a false statement was communicated to a prospective employer is
insufficient to establish the necessary causal connection.136 An employee must
prove that he or she was denied employment because a prospective employer
in fact relied on the false statement.137
The doctrine of self-compelled defamation is not the only new weapon in a
plaintiff’s arsenal to assist in challenging an allegedly defamatory employment
reference. A recent Supreme Court decision has created another new avenue
under Title VII by which an employee may seek to hold an employer liable for
such a reference.
3.

Title VII Retaliation Claims

In 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that a former employer
might be held liable under Title VII138 for retaliatory discharge139 based on a

134. Arthaud v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1999). In Neighbors
v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), the Missouri
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a libel claim based upon a service letter citing 50 Am.
Jur. 2d, Libel & Slander § 148 (1970):
Many cases make an exception to or qualification of the general rule that there must be a
communication to others than the person defamed, where the utterer of the defamatory
matter intends, or has reason to suppose, that in the ordinary course of events the matter
will come to the knowledge of some third person.
Neighbors, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
135. See Arthaud, 170 F.3d at 862.
136. See id.
137. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 1985).
138. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e –2(a)(1)-(2) (1994),
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privilege of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id.
139. Title VII also prohibits an employer, with fifteen or more employees, from retaliating
against an employee for filing a charge pursuant to the statute. Title VII provides, in pertinent
part:
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negative reference.140 In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the plaintiff alleged that
she was terminated from her position in retaliation for filing a claim with the
The Supreme Court
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.141
concluded that Congress intended Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to
extend to current and former employees and to encourage victims of
discrimination to file claims under Title VII even if the retaliation occurred
subsequent to the time of employment.142
Missouri courts have yet to find that a negative reference is sufficient to
establish a plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under Title VII.
However, the decision of at least one Missouri district court to dismiss a claim
based on a negative reference has been reversed as a result of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Robinson.143 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that the holding in Robinson is pertinent not only to
retaliation claims brought under Title VII, but also to claims of retaliation
brought pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.144
The Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson, litigation under the Service
Letter Statute, and threats of suits for defamation encourage employers to

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
140. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
141. See id. Note also that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the federal
agency responsible for enforcing Title VII. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
142. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. The Supreme Court reasoned that if Congress had
intended the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII only to apply to current employees, Congress
would have expressly limited the reach of the anti-retaliation provision to “current” employees.
Id. at 341-42.
143. See Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1997):
Although the District court held, and the University argues, that Title VII does not provide
a cause of action for retaliation that took place after employment has concluded, the
Supreme Court has now held that Title VII’s protections from retaliation extend to former
employees . . . and Smith may therefore recover for retaliation taken after her residency
ended.
....
If Schweiss provided negative references to Smith’s potential employers, as she contends,
and she demonstrates that he did so because she had complained about his harassment,
then a jury could reasonably conclude that the University was liable under Title VII for
retaliation.
Id. at 1266 (citation omitted).
144. See Blandin v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 4:96CV1130-DJS, 1997 WL 581562, at *8 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 25, 1997).
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include little or no information in an employee reference.145
These
disincentives to establishing more open reference policies are reinforced by the
possibility that a decision to provide a reference may expose an employer to
liability to third parties. Reference-based claims that may be brought by third
parties include allegations of negligent hiring and misrepresentation.
B.

Reference Based Claims Brought by Third Parties
1.

Negligent Hiring

In Gaines v. Monsanto Co., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District held that an employer might be held directly liable for negligent hiring
of an employee where “the employer knew or should have known of the
employee’s dangerous proclivities and the employer’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”146 The Gaines court found that
“[l]iability would depend, among other things, on the nature of the criminal
record and the surrounding circumstances.”147 Accordingly, a typical negligent
hiring claim turns on whether an employer adequately investigated a
prospective employee’s background to determine the applicant’s fitness for the
position.148 The magnitude of necessary investigation differs depending on the
type of job the applicant seeks.149
Thus, Missouri courts have imposed a duty on employers with sufficient
cause to inquire into a prospective employee’s background. Nevertheless, it
appears Missouri courts have yet to impose a corresponding duty on employers
to warn prospective employers of the applicant’s dangerous propensities. Such
a duty is the touchstone of the emerging cause of action of negligent
misrepresentation or referral.

145. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 694-96 (discussing factors that encourage employers to adopt
“no comment” or neutral job reference policies).
146. 655 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
147. Id. at 571 n.2 (citation omitted).
148. See J. Bradley Buckhalter, Comment, Speak No Evil: Negligent Employment Referral
and the Employer’s Duty to Warn (or, How Employers Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too), 22
SEATTLE U.L. REV. 265, 273 (1998) (citations omitted).
149. See Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer
Liability, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1645, 1650 (1991). In Hollingsworth v. Quick, 770 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989), the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District specifically declined the
plaintiff’s invitation to impose a duty on employers whose employees have contact with the
public to conduct a police and court records check on an applicant. See id. at 294. The court
stated that under such a duty “an employer who fails to make such an inquiry, even though not
alerted to do so by circumstances or information associated with a particular job applicant, may
be held liable if the employee later becomes involved in a confrontation . . . .” Id.
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Negligent Misrepresentation or Referral

Recent court decisions, including those in California, New Mexico and
Colorado, may be indicative of the judiciary’s willingness to rely on a theory
of negligent misrepresentation to hold employers liable when they choose to
provide a reference and misrepresent or omit relevant admonitory information
about an employee.150 In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, a
school district described its former vice-principal in glowing terms and
unconditionally recommended him for an administrative position in another
school district.151 The recommendation was made even though the school
district knew that the vice-principal had been forced to resign under pressure
due to his sexual misconduct involving female students.152 After securing a
job with a new school district based, at least in part, on the recommendation of
his prior employer, the administrator molested a thirteen year-old student in the
new district.153 The student sued the vice-principal’s former employers and
included an allegation of negligent misrepresentation in her complaint.154
The California Supreme Court ruled that the omission of information
concerning the sexual misconduct allegations, coupled with the unconditional
recommendation, amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation.155 The court
held that the former employer school district owed a duty to the injured student
to refrain from misrepresenting its former employee’s qualifications.156 The
court relied on sections 310157 and 311158 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
150. See Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); Davis v.
Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Fluid Tech., Inc. v. CVJ Axles,
Inc., 964 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). See also Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, inc., 766 F.2d 135,
140 (3rd Cir. 1985) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, citing to
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311A, 324A (1965); Golden Spread Council, Inc. v.
Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965). But see Cohen
v. Wales 133 A.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (refusing to recognize a duty when recommending
former employees “where another party is responsible for the actual hiring”).
151. 929 P.2d at 584-85.
152. See id. at 593.
153. See id. at 585.
154. See id. at 585-86.
155. See id. at 592-93.
156. See Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591.
157. Section 310 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states in pertinent part:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical
harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the
truth of the representation, if the actor:
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action
by the other, or a third person, which involved an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
the other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
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TORTS, in holding that the former employer was liable to the injured student.159
The court did attempt to limit its holding by restricting the duty not to
misrepresent only to instances where the making of representations “would
present a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to the prospective
employer or third person.”160 The court ruled that no duty to disclose is
present in the absence of resulting physical injury or a special relationship
between the parties.161
The Muroc court also addressed the applicability of California’s shield
law. The California Supreme Court was reluctant to find that the shield law
would protect employers from suits by injured third parties.162 According to
the court, legislative material provided by amicus curiae indicated that the state
law was “primarily intended to provide employers with a defense to actions by
former employees” and not to “insulate them from all tort liability arising from
employment disclosures.”163 Second, the court found the state’s reference
immunity statute was inapplicable to the Muroc facts because the information
provided by the administrator’s past employer was unsolicited, rather than
provided “upon request,” as required by the California shield law.164
Recently, a New Mexico state appeals court held, as did the Muroc court,
that under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311, an employer owes a
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965).
158. Section 311 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states in relevant part:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
159. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591. The Muroc court rejected arguments from the former employer
that once an employer decided to provide a reference, they would be forced to include all negative
information, including unproven rumors about former employees. See id. This risk, the school
district argued would simply encourage employers to adopt “no comment” policies or merely to
confirm only employee’s positions, salaries and dates of employment. Id. at 590. The Muroc
court found that an employer’s qualified privilege for providing a reference would provide
sufficient protection to encourage the exchange of reference information in the typical situation.
See id. at 590-91.
160. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591.
161. See id. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 315 cmt. c (1965), a
“special relationship” is found where the defendant has “a duty to take action for the aid or
protection of the plaintiff.” Id. For example, special relationships have been found to exist
between physiotherapist-patient, state parole boards and parolees, bartenders and patrons. See
Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1442 n.296 (collecting cases).
162. See Muroc, 964 P.2d at 591.
163. Id. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 47c (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
164. 964 P.2d at 591. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 47c.
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duty of care to a third-party victim when making employment
recommendations.165 In Davis v. Board of County Commissioners, law
enforcement personnel provided an unqualifiedly favorable employment
reference to an employee who had resigned instead of facing disciplinary
action for documented sexual harassment.166 The employee was hired by a
psychiatric hospital where he was then accused of sexually harassing a female
inmate.167 In reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held
that once the defendants elected to make recommendations, they owed a duty
of care “in regard to what they said and what they omitted from their
references.”168 The court found that the defendants had created a “special
relationship” with the plaintiff by undertaking to supply a reference.169 In
acknowledging that the issue of “foreseeability” was one for the jury, the court
wrote:
We are not persuaded that reasonable people, who had the information
possessed by [defendants], would not have foreseen potential victims like
Plaintiff, and could not have foreseen how the omission of objective
information, like [defendant’s] report and disciplinary actions taken, would not
pose a threat of physical harm to persons like Plaintiff.170

The court rejected defendants’ argument that expansion of a tort duty would
have a “chilling effect” on the willingness of employers to give references.171
Instead, the court concluded that the state’s common law qualified privilege
and its shield law provided an adequate counter-balance to the imposition of a
“sufficiently restricted” duty not to misrepresent in an employment reference
when there is a foreseeable risk of harm.172
In Fluid Technology, Inc. v. CVJ Axles, Inc., the defendant provided a
reference for a former bookkeeper asserting that she had been a “fine
employee,” despite the fact she had been terminated for stealing and had
consequently been convicted of the theft.173 The Colorado Court of Appeals
found the plaintiff had stated a claim for relief under the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) which provides:
One who, in the course of business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Davis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1180 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1175-76.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1180.
Davis, 964 P.2d at 1180.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1181-82.
964 P.2d 614, 615 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
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information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.174

The Fluid Technology court found that information given “in the course of the
defendant’s business, profession, or employment is sufficient indication that he
has a pecuniary interest in it . . . .”175
Still other courts have relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§302B in finding there is a duty of care to make admonitory disclosures in
employment references.176 Section 302B imposes liability:
[W]here the actor has brought into contact or association with the other a
person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to
commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar
opportunity or temptation for such misconduct.177

Although no Missouri court has yet imposed an affirmative duty on employers
to provide reference information about an employee’s dangerous propensities,
and several courts have in fact rejected such a theory,178 the mere possibility of
liability continues to create a disincentive for employer’s to provide
references.179
III. A CRITICAL LOOK AT MISSOURI’S SOLUTION
When Missouri passed its law, it joined the ranks of at least thirty other
states that provide some statutory immunity for employers providing
references.180 Nevertheless, a close examination of the language and its

174. Id. at 616 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977)).
175. Davis, 964 P.2d at 616 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) cmt. d
(1977)).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965).
177. Id.; Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1996).
178. See Kiren Dosanjh, Annotation, Former Employer’s or Supervisor’s Tort Liability to
Prospective Employer or Third Person for Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure in Employment
Reference, 68 A.L.R.5th 1 (1999). See also Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 48 F. Supp.
885 (D. Minn. 1999). The court discussed, and then rejected, the possibility that Minnesota might
recognize the tort of negligent representation. See id. at 888-92. The employee, who was
allegedly sexually harassed by her supervisor, sued the supervisor’s former employer for issuing a
favorable reference of the supervisor despite the former employer’s knowledge of instances of
alleged sexual assault and harassment on the part of supervisor. See id. at 886-87.
179. See Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey of
Recently Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187-88 (1997).
180. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West
Supp. 1996); CAL. CIV. CODE § 74(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114
(Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp.
1996); IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Supp. 1996); 745 ILL. COMP.STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp.
1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 91B.2 (West Supp. 1999);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-
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possible implications indicates that it contains several ambiguities that may
detract from the law’s ability to encourage employers to abandon their “no
comment” or neutral job reference policies.
A.

Who Receives Immunity Under the New Statute?

An “employer” under the new Missouri statute includes “any individual,
organization, partnership, political subdivision, corporation or other legal
entity which has or had in the entity’s employ one or more individuals
performing services for the entity.”181 As introduced, the new Missouri statute
included protection for an employer’s agent responding to a reference request,
but the language was deleted from the bill before its passage.182 This omission
may create litigation regarding who is clothed with immunity to respond to a
reference.183
The United States Supreme Court has held that, if an agent is guilty of
defamation, the principal is liable if the agent was apparently authorized to
make the defamatory statement.184 This decision might limit litigation when a
plaintiff attempts to hold an employer liable for the defamatory statements of
its personnel department.185 It may do little, however, to discourage court
battles regarding whether supervisory personnel, by virtue of their titles alone,
manifest apparent authority to make defamatory statements or whether
employers are liable for unauthorized statements made by non-supervisory
employees under common-law agency principles.186
423 (Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. §
240.152 (West Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.755 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1
(Michie Sup. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18 (Supp.
1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 61 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1 (Supp.
1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12
(Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); H.B. 341, 76th Leg. (Tex.
1999) (enacted) (to be codified at TEX. CODE ANN., ch. 103), UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp.
1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113 (Michie Supp.
1996).
181. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1(1).
182. As introduced, the bill that would have extended the immunity to “any person delegated
to act on the employer’s behalf.” H.B. 441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33. According to the bill’s
main sponsor, Representative Riback Wilson, this language was deleted because lobbyists for
employees feared it created a gray area that might allow an employer to blame an underling for
the content of a reference in an attempt to escape liability. See id.
183. See Jennifer L. Aaron, Comment, The Tug-of-War with Employment Information: Does
Louisiana Revised Statutes [sic] 23:291 Really Help Employers Stay Out of the Mud?, 58 LA. L.
REV. 1131, 1150 & n.156 (1998).
184. See id. at 1150 & n.156 (citing American Soc’y of Mechanical Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Co., 456 U.S. 556, 566 (1982)).
185. See Aaron, supra note 183, at 1150 n.156.
186. See id. at 1150 n.156.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

724

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:693

The new statute could be amended to clarify who may respond to a request
for a reference on the employer’s behalf while simultaneously maintaining an
employer’s immunity under the law.187 By extending protection to the
employer “and/or his expressly authorized designee,” as suggested by one legal
commentator, the statute would be “more protective of the interests of the
employee’s business reputation,” since it would remove unauthorized gossip
and conjecture from the protection of the statute.188
B.

Who May Request Information

To be protected under the new Missouri statute, an employer must respond
only upon request from a “prospective employer.”189 A prospective employer
includes any employer “to which an individual has made application or
employment, either oral or written, or forwarded a resume or other
correspondence expressing an interest in employment”190 or a person that the
employer “reasonably believes to be a prospective employer.”191 Requiring a
written request before statutory immunity attaches to a reference may shield
employers from claims for negligent hiring.192 The written requests could

187. A number of state statutes that define the term “employer” within the statute specifically
include an employer’s “agent” in the definition. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291(C)(1);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1(1); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.755(3)(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4113.71(A)(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(1). Although not specifically defining “employer”
within the statute, at least six other states provide reference immunity for an employer’s agent
who provides a reference. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10; IOWA CODE ANN. § 91b.2.1;
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12(c); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-10-18(1);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12. According to Mike Kaemmerer, who lobbied for the bill on
behalf of the Missouri Merchants and Manufacturers Association, protection for an employer’s
“agent” under the new law was not an issue that was discussed. See Interview with Mike
Keammerer, lobbyist for the Missouri Manufacturers Association, October 21, 1999 (on file with
author). However, it should be noted that the definition of “employer” in the new Missouri bill,
which includes “political sudivision[s],” provides protection for a much broader spectrum of the
work force than is covered under Missouri’s Service Letter Statute. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. §
290.152.1, with MO. REV. STAT. 290.140.
188. Aaron, supra note 183, at 1151. Aaron also suggests that “[b]y limiting the immunity
from liability to situations involving designees or authorized employees, the law would give
employers an incentive to appoint and train designees, perhaps reducing the instances of
defamation.” Id.
189. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1(2).
190. Id.
191. Id. This phrase did not appear in the original bill creating the statute. See H.B. 441 of
1/18/99, supra note 33. According to one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Riback Wilson,
this phrase was added to protect employers who feared that people fishing for information might
represent themselves as a prospective employer. See id. Representative Riback Wilson says that
Missouri businesses wanted protection if they inadvertently released information to the wrong
person. See id.
192. See Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1671-72.
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serve as “evidence that the employer investigated the candidate’s fitness for the
position before hiring.”193
Restricting the statutory protection to responses made at the request of a
prospective employer, fails to give statutory protection to employer responses
made pursuant to a request from a current or former employee.194 There
appears to be no real justification for limiting the new statutory immunity to
requests for references from prospective employers since the key to the
common law qualified privilege is that the information be divulged upon
request, rather than volunteered.195
Accordingly, the new statute could be amended so that its language mirrors
the Service Letter Statute.196 Under the Service Letter Statute, an employee
must send a request via certified mail and specifically identify the statute

193. Id. at 1671.
194. Nearly half of the states with shield laws provide protection to employers when
responding to requests, verbal or written, from either a prospective employer or a current or
former employee. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160; COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(3); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.095; IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 91B.2(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 291(A); MD. CODE ANN. § 5-423(a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452.2; N.C. GEN
STAT. § 1-539.12(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178.1; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2). At least five
additional states provide some immunity from civil liability for employers providing references
without a request for the information. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-53-1(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598; N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1113(a).
195. Pursuant to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977), whether a reference is
made in response to a request is one factor in determining whether the publication is privileged:
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce
a correct or reasonable belief that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the recipient or
a third person, and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under legal duty to publish the
defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication is otherwise within the generally
accepted standards of decent conduct.
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted standards of decent
conduct it is an important factor that
(a) the publication is made in response to a request rather than volunteered by the
publisher or
(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties.
Id. (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977) (“An occasion
makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances lead any one of several persons
having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that
there is information that another sharing the common interest is entitled to know.”).
196. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1 (“Whenever any employee . . . requests in writing by
certified mail . . . with specific reference to the statute . . . it shall be the duty of the
superintendent or manager . . . to issue to such employee, within forty-five days after receipt of
such request, a letter . . . .”)
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before the duty to respond arises on the part of the employer.197 A request for
a service letter made by regular mail, rather than certified mail, does not give
rise to a duty on the part of the employer to respond, even if the employer in
fact receives the request.198
C. How to Respond
To come within the safe harbor of Missouri’s reference immunity statute,
an employer must respond “in writing” to a request concerning a current or
former employee.199 Requiring a written response under reference immunity
statutes, rather than extending protection to verbal recommendations, affords
additional protection to employers.200 A written response may protect
employers against claims for negligent referral because an employer “would
have direct evidence regarding the extent of its knowledge about the position
for which the applicant was being considered, and thus, the extent to which the
plaintiff’s harm was foreseeable.”201 A written response also creates additional
protection for employees because they will have a written copy of any
defamatory reference to use as evidence in a lawsuit challenging its accuracy.
Proscribing a written response also insures that employees know exactly what
information is being shared with their prospective employers, thereby
circumventing the so-called “wink and nod” approach.202 This approach may
allow employers who purport to give only “no comment” or neutral job
references to convey a message about the employee through voice tone or
inflection.203
D. What Information May or Must be Provided
Under Missouri’s reference immunity statute, qualified immunity attaches
when an employer discloses “the nature and character of service rendered by
such employee to such employer and the duration thereof,” and “truly state[s]
for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit.”204
197. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
198. See Bartareau v. Executive Bus. Prods., Inc., 846 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
199. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(1).
200. See Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1671-72.
201. Id. at 1672.
202. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the “wink and nod” approach).
203. Id.
204. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(2)-(3). This is the same language as is used in the
Missouri Service Letter Statute. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. As originally introduced, the
new law would have amended the Service Letter Statute by further defining the information to be
included in a service letter. See H.B. 441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33. Thus, the Service Letter
Statute would have been amended to conform to the newly proposed sections addressing
employer liability for issuing written references. See id. The proposed language would have
required that the letter include “(1) Date and duration of employment; (2) Most recent pay level;
(3) Most recent job description and duties; (4) Wage history for the most recent two years or the
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A statutory definition of the information an employer may disclose may be a
key ingredient in the protection of employees from publication of immaterial
defamatory information.205 It may also encourage employers to include
pertinent information to try and insulate themselves from liability for punitive
damages for providing a reference.206 As currently written, however, the
definition of the required response under the statute is ambiguous.207
The statute merely states that an employer “may” respond to a request for a
reference in writing and lists two categories of information that an employer
“may” divulge under the statute.208 Although the two categories of
information listed are joined by the word “and,”209 there is nothing in the
statute’s language requiring an employer to include both categories of
information in a response.210 To address this ambiguity, the statute could be
amended to require that employers wishing to insulate themselves from
liability for punitive damages when providing a reference be required to
include certain information. One of the major purposes of the act is to aid
Missouri employers in making better-informed hiring decisions.211 As the
statute reads now, a court could conclude that an employer is protected even if
he chooses to include only one category of information specified in the
statute.212
Moreover, at least one Missouri court has held that the common law
qualified privilege protects a wide variety of information that may be included

length of employment, whichever is shorter; and (5) Whether the employee was discharged or
voluntarily quit the service and the reason for the separation.” Id. According to one of the
measure’s sponsors, Representative Riback Wilson, there was considerable opposition to
amending the Service Letter Statute from lobbyists for larger employers who feared that making a
change in the contents of letters required under the statute would increase costs and confuse those
businesses and human resource managers already accustomed to conforming with the Service
Letter Statute’s dictates. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. Representative Riback
Wilson says that following a public hearing, the bill was amended so that it no longer amended
the Service Letter Statute to conform to the new law, but rather, made the new law conform to the
Service Letter Statute. See id; House Comm. Sub. for H.R. 441, 90th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.
1999) version dated March 4, 1999 available in 1999 MO H.B. 441 (Westlaw, MO-BILLS
database).
205. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 692 (asserting that a specific definition of job performance
would discourage plaintiffs from arguing that references fall outside the scope of the definition
and would discourage employers from including irrelevant information).
206. See id.
207. See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(1).
208. Id. § 290.152.2(2)-(3) (These categories include the nature, character and duration of
service rendered, and the true cause, if any, of the employee’s voluntary or involuntary separation
from employment).
209. Id.
210. See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.
211. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussion of statute’s purposes).
212. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2.
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in a reference.213 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that so long as the
communication is made in good faith, “the person making the statement is not
limited to facts that are within his personal knowledge, but may, and should,
pass on to his inquirer all relevant information that has come to him, regardless
of whether he believes it to be true or not.”214 It is doubtful the Missouri
General Assembly intended to narrow the common law qualified privilege
since one of the stated purposes of the new law is to encourage the free-flow of
information between employers.215
Furthermore, the legislature chose to adopt the language in the Service
Letter Statute that has spawned the majority of litigation under that statute
relating to reference claims.216 Accordingly, the new statute should be
amended to clarify and expand the information an employer may share and still
be protected by the statutory qualified immunity.217
The Louisiana reference immunity statute, for example, defines “job
performance” to include, but not limited to, “attendance, attitude, awards,
demotions, duties, efforts, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promotions, and
disciplinary actions.”218 A recent scholarly critique of the Louisiana law
indicates that three years after its passage no cases had yet been decided
applying the statute.219 Thus, no empirical evidence exists to suggest that the
Louisiana definition of “job performance” will be a portion of the statute that is
frequently litigated. Clearly, the Louisiana statute gives employers much more
guidance regarding the information to be included in a job reference than the
new Missouri law does.
In summary, at a minimum, the new statute could be amended to clarify
that an employer must include both categories of information to gain the

213. See Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
214. Id. at 833.
215. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (reporting the purposes of the act as
viewed by the sponsor of the new bill).
216. See supra notes 55-89 and accompanying text (discussing litigation under the Service
Letter Statute).
217. Most states do not explicitly provide immunity for the disclosure of the reasons for an
employee’s separation from employment. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09-65.160; 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 46/10; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105. At least
four other states with shield laws provide complete immunity to employers for providing certain
basic information about employees, such as wage rates and dates of employment, but provide
only qualified immunity if an employer discloses the reasons for an employees’ separation from
employment. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b)-(d). It appears that only two states
specifically provide for some of type of employer immunity if an employer discloses an illegal or
wrongful act, however, neither of these states require that an employee actually be convicted of a
crime before immunity attaches to the disclosure. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41-755(1)(c).
218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.
219. See Aaron, supra note 183, at 1150.
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statutory protection. Additionally, the information protected under the statute
could be expanded to give employers more guidance when they attempt, in
good faith, to comply with the law.
E.

Who Receives a Copy?

Lobbyists for Missouri employee groups worked hard to ensure that
employees would have a right to obtain a copy of any response protected by
the new statute.220 The Missouri statute requires employers to send a copy of
any response made pursuant to the statute to the affected employee at the
employee’s last known address.221 The new law also allows an employee to
request a copy of any letter provided under the statute “for up to one year
following the date of such letter.”222 The provision of the statute addressing
available damages, however, is silent as to any penalty an employer may face
for failing to provide a copy of the reference to the employee.223
It is important to guarantee that employees are aware of the contents of any
reference letter sent to prospective employers. To assure employees receive
this benefit, the statute could be amended to allow an award of damages
against an employer who fails to mail a copy of any response to the
employee’s last known address or provide a copy upon request of the
employee.224 This amendment would create no additional burden for
employers while ensuring an employee is aware of the information being
shared with his or her prospective employer.
F.

When is the Statutory Privilege Forfeited?

Missouri’s statute creates an implied assumption that employers are
replying in good faith when responding to reference requests.225 To overcome
the good faith presumption, an employee must prove that the response “was
false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for
whether such response was true or false.”226 This standard is nearly identical
220. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.
221. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.3.
222. Id. Originally, the bill proposing the new law provided only for a copy to be sent to the
affected employee at his or her last known address. See H.B. 441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33.
According to Representative Riback Wilson, one of the bill’s sponsors, the provision was added
in consideration of employees who did not want anyone to know where they lived, in particular,
victims of domestic violence. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.
223. See MO REV. STAT. § 290.152.5.
224. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.
225. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.152.4. The vast majority of states explicitly state that an
employer is presumed to be acting in good faith. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361;
IDAHO CODE § 44-201; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1.
226. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4. As introduced, the proposal would have required a
plaintiff to prove that the response “was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false at a time when the employer had
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to that needed to overcome the qualified privilege that attaches to employee
references under Missouri common law.227 Legal commentators who have
called for a uniform standard to overcome the qualified privilege in reference
cases seem to agree that the standard chosen by Missouri legislators is an
appropriate one.228
G. What Burden of Proof is Required?
The Missouri statute does not define the standard of proof required to
overcome an employer’s privilege for providing a reference.229 Legal
commentators appear to agree that the standard of proof should be defined
within the statute.230 These scholars also seem to agree that the more stringent
“clear and convincing” standard rather than the “preponderance of the
evidence” standard, should be used when defining the burden of proof
necessary to overcome the qualified immunity that attaches to letters of
reference.231 The more burdensome clear and convincing standard may make

serious doubt whether such response was true.” H.B.441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33. However,
the underlined portion of the standard was deleted prior to the bill’s passage. According to the
law’s co-sponsor, Representative Riback Wilson, this language was deleted at the request of
employer groups who felt that the omission of this language would offer them better protection
from liability under the statute. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.
227. See Snodgrass v. Headco Indus., Inc., 630 S.W.2d at 154-55 (citing MAI 23.10(2)). The
standard also mirrors the standard necessary to overcome the qualified privilege in a public-figure
defamation action, as well as the standard necessary to overcome the qualified privilege to a
defamation action under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Compare New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), defining “actual malice” as knowledge that the published
statement was “false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,” with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977), regarding “abuse” of the qualified privilege
which may be shown if false and defamatory matter is published when the publisher (a) knows
the matter to be false, or (b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity”, id., with the new
Missouri statutory standard for overcoming the qualified privilege which requires a showing that
the response be “false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for
whether such response was true or false.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4.
228. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 756-58; Saxton, supra note 19, at 83-85; Adler & Pierce,
supra note 3, at 1458-59.
229. At least eight other states do not define an employee’s burden of proof. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE ANN. § 47(c); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61. The majority of states require a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence to overcome an employer’s statutory qualified
immunity. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
423.452(2). A minority of jurisdictions requires the stricter clear and convincing standard to
overcome the employer’s presumption of good faith. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(3).
230. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 756-58.
231. See id. at 756-58; Saxton, supra note 19, at 110; Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1456
(“[W]e recommend this higher standard to signal society’s view that liability ought to attach in
employment-reference cases only in compelling circumstances.”).
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employers more comfortable including detailed information, both positive and
negative, in an employee reference.232
It should be noted, however, that these legal commentators are not
addressing statutes, like the new Missouri statute, wherein employees are
completely disabled from receiving punitive damages if an employer abuses
the statutory qualified immunity.233 To strike a better balance between an
employer’s protection under the Missouri statute, and the availability of a
remedy to a prevailing plaintiff, the preponderance standard seems better
suited to the Missouri statutory scheme. Plaintiffs are already foreclosed from
a punitive damage remedy under the new law, and the strict “clear and
convincing standard” might make it too difficult for the truly aggrieved
employee to obtain any relief at all.
H. Unique Features of the Missouri Law
The new Missouri law contains several unique features that do not appear
in other states’ shield laws. First, Missouri’s statute is the only one that
attempts to limit any successful plaintiff under the statute to an award of
compensatory damages. Second, the Missouri statute attempts to address an
employer’s liability when the prospective employer receives the requested
reference after the applicant has already been hired. These features are
designed to make the Missouri statute more effective than other states’ statutes
in encouraging employers to share reference information.
1.

The Unavailability of Punitive Damages

Missouri appears to be the only state that specifically addresses the
available damages under its reference immunity statute.234 An employer who
violates the section of the statute proscribing the allowable contents of a
reference “shall be liable for compensatory damages but not punitive
damages.”235 However, the new Missouri statute places the bar to a punitive
damage award in a subsection that is distinct from the subsection giving
employers qualified immunity for providing a reference.236 A narrow reading
of the statute might actually allow for an award of punitive damages if an
employee can show that the statutory qualified privilege has been abused.
To understand this ambiguity, it may be helpful to parse the new statute.
In pertinent part, subsection 2 of the new statute provides:

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See Oliver, supra note 3, at 757.
See id.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5.
Id.
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4-5.
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2. An employer may:
(1) Respond in writing to a written request concerning a current or former
employee from an entity or person which the employer reasonably believes to
be a prospective employer of such employee; and
(2) Disclose the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to
such employer and the duration thereof: and
(3) Truly state for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or
voluntarily quit such service.237

While subsection 5 of the new statute reads:
5. Any employer who violates the provisions of subsection 2 of this section
shall be liable for compensatory damages but not punitive damages.238

It is difficult to conceive of a damage award that would punish employers who
failed to comply with a voluntary requirement.
Missouri lawmakers also chose to place the immunity for an employer in a
separate subsection stating:
4. For purposes of this section, an employer shall be immune from civil
liability for any response made pursuant to this section or for any
consequences of such response, unless such response was false and made with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether such
response was true or false.239

This portion of the statute appears merely to clothe employment references
with the same qualified privilege given to references under Missouri’s
common law.240 Under Missouri’s common law, if a defamation plaintiff
meets the burden outlined in subsection 4, the plaintiff may be entitled to seek
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.241 Under this
interpretation, the new Missouri statute does not protect employers from an
award of punitive damages, even though limiting an employers liability was
one of the purposes of the bill.242
For example, in a reference Employer A states that an employee was
terminated for insubordination. Employer A fails to include, however, the
nature, character or duration of the employee’s service to the employer. A
court could then find that the employer failed to comply with subsection 2 of
the statute. Thus, the employee would not be entitled to punitive damages
237. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2 (emphasis added).
238. Id. § 290.152.5.
239. Id. § 290.152.4.
240. See supra note 227 (comparing the standard necessary to overcome the qualified
privilege under the common law with that required by the new statute).
241. See supra note 113 (discussing the availability of punitive damages in a common law
defamation action).
242. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the new statute’s purposes).
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under subsection 5 of the statute, which provides that no punitive damages are
available for a violation of subsection 2 of the statute.
Nevertheless, the Court could find that in addition to violating subsection 2
of the statute, the employer’s response was made with reckless disregard for
whether the response was true or not, thereby violating subsection 4 of the
statute. Subsection 4 of the statute does not limit an employee’s available
remedies and merely outlines the standard for overcoming the statutory
qualified immunity. This standard mirrors the standard for overcoming the
qualified privilege that attaches to employment references under Missouri
common law. Therefore, the court could apply common law defamation
principles and conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to seek punitive damages.
Thus, the statute may actually both prohibit and enable a plaintiff to seek
punitive damages under the same section.243 Clearly, such a result was not one
that the legislature intended when the statute was drafted. To address this
ambiguity, the new Missouri statute could be amended to clearly prohibit an
award of punitive damages against an employer who responds to a reference
request.
2.

Protection after Hiring Has Occurred

The Missouri statute appears unique in providing that qualified immunity
applies “regardless of whether the employee becomes employed by the
prospective employer prior to receipt of the former employer’s written
response.”244 This provision would extend an employer’s statutory qualified
immunity to situations in which an employee is hired by an employer prior to
receipt of a written response made pursuant to the statute, but then loses the job
after the response is received by his new employer.245 Presumably, this would
absolve a former employer from liability based, for example, on a claim of
tortious interference with economic advantage.246
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION
The state legislature should consider (1) amending the Missouri employer
reference immunity statute to require an employer to respond to a proper
request from a current or former employee or prospective employer; (2)
placing a limited duty to warn on employers when responding to requests from

243. See supra note 113 (discussing availability of punitive damages under a common law
defamation claim in Missouri).
244. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(3).
245. See Aaron, supra note 183, at 1152-53 (suggesting Louisiana’s employer immunity
statute might not cover a situation where an employee has already been hired when the reference
is requested); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997).
246. See supra note 45 (discussing the tort of intentional interference with economic
advantage).
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prospective employers in certain occupations; (3) allowing an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party; and (4) repealing the Missouri
Service Letter Statute. 247
A.

Make the Shield Law Mandatory

Despite the passage of voluntary “shield laws” in two-thirds of the states,
and proposals from a variety of legal commentators attempting to encourage
the free flow of information, employers maintain a “name, rank, and serial
number” mentality.248 Perhaps the time has come for a mandatory shield law
that (1) rewards employees who deserve a good recommendation; (2) attempts
to weed-out those employees who may be dangerous to their co-workers or the
general public; and (3) protects employers from large damage awards.
During the 1999 legislative session, the state’s large employers lobbied
against a mandatory shield law because they feared it would create another
opportunity for litigating employee reference claims.249 It would appear,
however, that the only way to avoid litigation under the statute that was
enacted would be for employers to choose simply not to use it.
Making the employer immunity statute mandatory will create another
avenue for employees to challenge allegedly defamatory references.
Nevertheless, in return for the creation of this new statutory cause of action
employers would receive a number of benefits. Employers will enjoy
immunity from an award of punitive damages even if the reference is found to
violate the statute. Requiring employers to give a more complete reference
will, in turn, increase the information they receive about an applicant. Thus,
employers will be able to make better-informed hiring decisions. The ability to
make more informed hiring decisions should allow employers to choose the
most qualified applicant, leading to decreased turn over and training costs.
Better-informed hiring decisions might also create a corresponding decrease in
an employer’s potential liability for negligent hiring because employers will
have sufficient information to avoid hiring a potentially dangerous employee.
The burden created by a mandatory reference immunity statute would
initially fall disproportionately on employers.250 Missouri employers would be
required to educate themselves and their human resource personnel on properly
247. It is doubtful that such a proposal could garner any support in Missouri’s current
political climate. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33 (indicating that a statute imposing
a duty on an employer to respond to a reference request would not pass in the current political
environment because lobbyists for large businesses feared it would create another opportunity for
litigation). See also infra notes 296-313 and accompanying text (outlining statutory language that
might be employed to enact the proposals contained in this Comment).
248. See supra notes 2-25 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 204 (discussing employer concerns over amended the Service Letter
Statute).
250. See id.
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responding to a request issued under the statute. However, the statute would
also give employers specific statutory guidance regarding the type of
information to be included in any mandatory response. Additionally, absent a
proper request from an employee or employer, no duty to respond would arise
on the part of the employer.251
One of the main arguments against amending the current Service Letter
Statute, rather than creating a new employer reference immunity statute, came
from employers already required to respond under the Service Letter Statute.252
These employers feared they would be required to expend additional time and
money to retrain their human resource personnel.253 Although this argument
eventually won the day and the lawmakers did not amend the Service Letter
Statute, the fact that employers already have policies in place to ensure
compliance with the Service Letter Statute supports the contention that
employers are capable of instituting policies and procedures enabling them to
comply with the new law. Thus, it can be argued that complying with a
mandatory reference immunity statute would require only an initial
expenditure to establish proper policies and procedures but would not impose
an undue burden on employers.
Finally, it is conceded that if employers are required to respond to a proper
request made under the statute, they may no longer be able to avoid liability
under a negligent misrepresentation theory by simply choosing to remain
silent.254 Few courts, however, have embraced this theory in the employment
context in the years following the Muroc decision.255 Moreover, Missouri
corporate employers may not remain silent in the face of a proper request
under the Service Letter Statute.256 Still, it appears no Missouri court has held
an employer liable for negligent misrepresentation for failing to include
negative information in a service letter.
Nevertheless, to address the possibility that Missouri courts might imply a
“duty to warn” from an employer’s required response under a mandatory
reference statute, this Comment suggests that the legislature strictly limit any
such duty. First, any statute creating a duty to warn should include a specific
definition of the information that must be included in a reference. Second, the

251. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing similar requirement under
Missouri Service Letter Statute).
252. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.
253. See id.
254. See Davis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1181-83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999)
(concluding that expanding liability for negligent misrepresentation into the employment
reference context will not “have a chilling effect on employer willingness to give references,
whether good or bad . . . .”).
255. See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text (discussing the tort of negligent
misrepresentation or referral).
256. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
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duty to include this information should be further narrowed to apply only to
requests for references from employers whose employees pose a high risk of
injury to third persons.257
B.

Theoretical Support for Imposing a Very Limited Duty to Warn

Our tort law system has been very reluctant to impose an affirmative duty
on individuals to warn or protect other people.258 Under the common law, an
employer has no duty to respond to a reference request from a prospective
employer and disclose an employee’s unfavorable traits, even if those
characteristics may suggest a propensity for danger.259 However, calls for
imposing a duty to warn have been sounded by legal commentators for nearly a
decade.260
Janet Swerdlow, one of the earliest authors to propose that a duty to warn
be placed on employers, based her proposal on the seminal case of Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California.261 In Tarasoff, a psychologist told
campus police to detain a student because the student had confided to the
therapist that he intended to kill an unnamed, but readily identifiable female
student.262 Although the patient was detained for a short while, neither the
female student nor her family was warned of the possible imminent danger.263

257. See supra notes 150-79 (discussing negligent referral cause of action).
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1977) (“The fact that an actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself
impose upon him a duty to take such action.”).
259. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 66.
260. See Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1670 (“To protect society from potential dangers while
not unduly exposing employees to a risk of being defamed, it is necessary to impose a duty to
warn.”); Saxton, supra note 19, at 91 (“This section proposes that [S]tates should . . . impose a
limited duty on employers to respond to reference inquiries . . . . In appropriate circumstances, an
employer’s breach of this duty could cause the employer to be liable in tort for injuries caused to
third parties by the employer’s former employee, if the employer withheld reference information
that might have prevented the injuries.”); Buckhalter, supra note 148, at 310 (“The law can best
encourage the disclosure of reference information by imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure
on employers.”); Oliver, supra note 3, at 755 (“[T]o encourage employers to abandon their
policies . . . state legislatures [should] adopt ‘good faith’ reference statutes that also place a
narrow duty to disclose information regarding a departing employee’s or former employee’s
violent or dangerous behavior.”). But see Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1447 (“If employers
are to have a general duty to warn of a former employee’s dangerous propensities - - and we
remain open but unconvinced on that point - - we prefer that they duty be to alter public
authorities about the danger, if it is sufficiently grave, clear, and imminent, rather than to notify
the prospective employers.”); J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference
Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1998) (“[D]isclosure obligations might well produce more
harm than good.”).
261. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
262. See id. at 341.
263. See id.
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Shortly thereafter, the patient killed the female student.264 The victim’s parents
sued the Regents of the University of California based on their “failure to warn
of a dangerous patient.”265
The Tarasoff court noted that the common law has created an exception to
the general “no duty rule” in cases where a “special relationship” exists
between the defendant and the dangerous person or his or her foreseeable
victim.266 The court found that the bond between a psychotherapist and a
patient created a “special relationship” that warranted placing an affirmative
duty to warn on the psychotherapist for the benefit of third persons.267
Likewise, commentators have compared the employer-employee relationship
to that of a therapist and a patient “because prospective new employers, their
employees and members of the general public may be able to avoid
unnecessary exposure to potential harm if former employers are required to
disclose information that would warn a prospective new employer of an
applicant’s dangerous or criminal tendencies.”268 Additionally, legal scholars
have noted that “an employer may acquire special knowledge of an
individual’s dangerous or criminal tendencies in the course of the employeremployee relationship.”269
Commentators also suggest that the “special relationship” between a
former employer and a prospective employer supports imposing a limited duty
to warn.270 They assert that the “dependency” of the prospective employer on
the former employer is “analogous to the ‘dependencies’ giving rise to duties

264. See id.
265. Id. at 341.
266. 551 P.2d at 343.
267. Id. The Tarasoff court also addressed the fact that the duty to warn might erode the
patient’s faith in the psychotherapist-patient privilege but concluded “that the public policy
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective
privilege ends where the public peril begins.” Id. at 347.
268. Saxton, supra note 19, at 94.
269. Id. at 94.
270. None of the commentators who have proposed the limited duty to warn have gone so far
as to require employers to volunteer information about an employee’s dangerous propensities:
While employers could conceivably be required to act as “volunteers” in this fashion,
administrative and practical concerns suggest that it would not be fair or reasonable to
require them to do so; moreover, the prospect of liability for “negligent hiring” should
already be strongly encouraging prospective employers to contact their applicants’ former
employers for reference information.
Saxton, supra note 19, at 96. However, at least one author has suggested protecting those
employers that see a “moral duty” to volunteer such information. “Balancing the interests
involved, the requirement that information be requested is imprudent. Statements made by a
former employer compelled by a moral duty to divulge are protected by the jurisprudential
qualified immunity if the information is given in good faith.” Aaron, supra note 183, at 1152.
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of protection under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.”271 For example,
comment b to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A indicates that
“[t]he law appears . . . to be working slowly toward recognition of the duty to
aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”272
Janet Swerdlow asserts that “[b]ecause it is foreseeable that certain information
regarding the job applicant’s suitability for employment would not be known
by anyone other than the applicant’s former employer, [the prospective
employer] is dependent upon [the former employer] to provide this valuable
information.”273
It should be noted that when Swerdlow wrote her article, the California
Supreme Court had not yet decided Muroc.274 Thus, current supporters of an
employer’s limited duty to warn base the need for such a duty on cases like
Muroc.275 By extending liability only to employers who voluntarily respond to
a job reference request, Muroc encourages employers to retain their “no
comment” policies.276 Commentators also highlight the increase in workplace
violence as a basis for imposing a duty to warn on employers.277

271. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 95 (footnote omitted). Under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A (1977), the following are examples of “dependency” relationships and their
corresponding duties:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or
injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members
of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another
under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for
protection is under a similar duty to the other.
Id.
272. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965).
273. Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1661.
274. See Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); supra notes
151-64 and accompanying text (examining the Muroc decision).
275. See generally Oliver, supra note 3, at 737-48 (discussing recent case law leading to her
conclusion that a duty to warn should be imposed on employer’s responding to references).
276. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 3, at 753-54; Bradley Saxton, Employment Reference in
California after Randi W. v. Muroc Joint United School District: A Proposal for Legislation To
Promote Responsible Employment Reference Practices, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 240
(1997). See also Davis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999)
(while recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the employment referral context,
noting that to avoid liability the defendants “could have remained silent in response to requests
for information . . . .”).
277. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 691-92; Markita D. Cooper, Beyond Name, Rank and Serial
Number: “No Comment” Job Reference Polices [sic], Violent Employees and the Need for
Disclosure-Shield Legislation, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 292-98 (1998).
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J. Bradley Buckhalter, a recent advocate of imposing a limited duty to
warn on employers, asserts that holding employers liable for failing to disclose
an employee’s dangerous propensities would comport with general tort
doctrine by giving “effect to both the fault and foreseeability principle . . . .”278
By withholding information about an employee whom the employer knows
with reasonable certainty will likely present a continuing risk of harm to
others, Buckhalter asserts that the employer “chooses to engage in conduct that
ultimately result in harm to innocent victims.”279 Accordingly, the choice to
withhold such information “places the employer within the realm of legal
fault,” warranting departure from the “no duty to act” rule.280 Buckhalter
further suggests that an employer owes a duty to former employee’s potential
victims because “the employer knows what the victim does not: that a former
employee poses a risk of harm.”281
It is clear that theoretical support abounds among legal commentators for
imposing a duty to warn on employers to protect innocent third parties.
Nevertheless, most of these commentators agree that this duty should be
strictly limited.
1.

Limiting the Duty to Warn

Several limitations on the proposed duty to warn would be prudent.282
First, in his assessment of this issue, Professor Bradley Saxton suggests that it
would be necessary to limit the types of information about former employees
that would require disclosure.283 The required disclosure should be limited to
ensure that only information that appears reasonably necessary to warn the
prospective employer of the employee’s “propensity to engage in violent or
dangerous conduct posing a threat of physical injury to others.”284 Although
this standard may seem workable in hindsight, as it was in Muroc,285 how
likely is it that the average employer is prepared to judge, in advance, whether
an employee or former employee has such a “propensity”? Rather than forcing
employers to speculate as to a given employee’s “propensity” for violence,
specific categories of behavior can be defined in the statute that are indicative
of an employee’s tendency to engage in harmful conduct in the workplace.286

278. See Buckhalter, supra note 148, at 294.
279. Id. at 294.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 295.
282. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 19, at 96-99; Long, supra note 179, at 214-219 (advocating
against a blanket duty to warn on all employers).
283. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 96-97, 109.
284. Id.
285. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 589.
286. See Cooper, supra note 277:
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As an additional safeguard for employees who fear one minor outburst at the
office will harm their chances for future employment, the duty to include
admonitory information in a reference can be limited to certain occupations in
which an employee’s contact with third persons creates a high risk of potential
harm.287
Missouri law also supports imposing a duty to warn when an applicant
seeks a position that carries a high risk of potential harm to others. One
Missouri statute provides that a criminal records check be performed, with the
employee’s consent, for certain “providers,” including day care homes and
centers; employers of nurses; public or private “youth services” agencies, such
as schools; and employment settings in which an applicant would come “in
contact with minors, patients or residents.”288 Another Missouri statute
requires people seeking employment with certain state agencies, including
“any state agency which provides programs, care or treatment for or which
exercises supervision over minors,” undergo a criminal records check.289
To conclude, rather than rely on the traditional tort law principles that
impose a duty to warn based on a “special relationship,” the Missouri statute
could provide clearer and more specific requirements for a duty to warn by: (1)
carefully defining the type of admonitory information an employer is required
to include in a reference, and (2) limiting the reach of the duty to warn to
employment settings in which there is a high risk of harm to third parties.
C. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
The Missouri statute currently does not provide for an award of costs and
attorneys’ fees to a party who prevails in a suit brought under the statute. The

The proposed affirmative duty to disclose workplace violence in job references is limited.
It does not require disclosure of displays of anger, loss of temper, or frustration on the job.
Nor would the duty require employers to disclose incidents with purely economic
consequences, such as theft, embezzlement, or similar offenses. The statute requires
disclosure of violent conduct that physically injured or posed a significant risk of physical
injury to employees, customers, or clients in the workplace.
Id. at 326 (footnotes omitted). These categories of behavior can be defined using recent court
decisions holding employers liable for the foreseeable acts of violent employees as well as police
profiles developed to assist employers in identifying employees with a propensity for violence in
the workplace. See, e.g., supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases in
which employers have been found liable for failing to disclose an employee’s harmful conduct to
a prospective employer); MISSOURI CAPITOL POLICE, MO. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY, VIOLENCE IN
THE WORKPLACE, at 3-4 (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.dps.state.mo.use/dps/mcp.study/wr
kvio.html> [hereinafter MISSOURI CAPITOL POLICE].
287. See Long, supra note 179, at 217 (suggesting restricting the duty to warn to “situations in
which a high risk of danger exists or in which the consequences of dangerous employees are
likely to severe”).
288. MO. REV. STAT. § 43.540 (1994).
289. MO. REV. STAT. § 43.543 (1994).
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shield laws of at least two other states contain a section addressing attorneys’
Additionally, the model statutes of several legal
fees and costs.290
commentators have proposed fee-shifting provisions.291 The fee-shifting rule
is designed to encourage employers to adopt more open reference policies by
abating fears that they will be forced to defend even reasonable and defensible
reference practices.292 Moreover, a fee-shifting provision creates incentives for
both plaintiffs and defendants to settle any litigation early if they find their
position to be legally indefensible.293 Finally, the proposed fee-shifting rule
might more fully compensate an aggrieved employee under the statute who is
effectively prohibited from an award of punitive damages.294
D. Repeal the Missouri Service Letter Statute
A mandatory reference immunity statute would eliminate the need for
Missouri’s Service Letter Statute which has created a somewhat confusing
body of law regarding the availability of punitive damages, despite the 1982
amendment intended to limit such awards.295 Those employees covered by the
Service Letter Statute, which entitles them to request a reference, would not
lose this benefit. Employees formerly covered by the Service Letter Statute
would be included within the coverage of the mandatory reference immunity
statute, which also would entitle employees to request a reference and to
receive a copy of any reference made pursuant to the statute.
E.

Proposed Statute

The following proposed statute combines the suggestions for reform of the
new Missouri statute in this Comment with those of several legal
commentators who have recently written on the subject of employment
references. This proposal is forwarded solely for discussion and is merely
intended to reflect the continuing need to attempt to balance the interests of
employees, employers and the general public in creating a safe and effective
work environment:

290. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(I) (a court “shall award court costs, attorneys fees
and other related expenses to any party that prevails in any civil proceeding in which a violation
of this section is alleged”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(C) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997)
(allowing for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs of the defendant if there is a
jury verdict in favor of the defendant and “the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the lawsuit constituted frivolous conduct”).
291. See, e.g., Long, supra note 179, at 220-21; Saxton, supra note 19, at 52, 110-12.
292. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 104.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See supra notes 55-89 (discussing Missouri Service Letter Statute).
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1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean:
(1) “Employer” means any individual, organization, partnership, political
subdivision, corporation or other legal entity, and/or such entity’s
expressly authorized designee, which has or had in the entity’s employ one
or more individuals performing services for the entity within this state;296
(2) “Employee” means any person, paid or unpaid, performing services for
an employer, as defined in this section;297
(3) “Prospective employer” means any employer, as defined in this
section, to which an individual has made application for employment,
either oral or written, or forwarded a resume or other correspondence
expressing an interest in employment;298
(4) “Job performance” includes, but is not limited to, attendance, awards,
dates of service, duties, level of pay, promotions, skills, and reasons for
separation from employment;299
(5) “Harmful or Violent Conduct” includes, but is not limited to, battery,
assault, threats of violence, physical fighting, possession of weapons,
physical harassment, child molestation and sexual harassment;300
(6) “Workplace” means at the employers place of business or at a site
wherein the employee is acting at the direction of the employer or upon the
employer’s behalf.301
2. Any former or current employee or prospective employer may request in
writing by certified mail addressed to the manager, owner, supervisor or
registered agent of such employer, with specific reference to this statute and, if
applicable, with specific reference to subsection 4 of this section, a letter
setting forth information pertaining to the job performance of the employee.302
3. Any employer who receives a proper request made pursuant to subsection 2
of this section from a current or former employee, prospective employer, or
from an entity or person the employer reasonably believes to be a prospective
employer shall, within thirty (30) working days of receipt of such letter,
respond in writing setting forth information pertaining to the job performance
of such employee. Any employer who responds by letter pursuant to this
296. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1; Aaron, supra note 183, at 1151; supra notes 181-86
and accompanying text.
297. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1.
298. See id.
299. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 423.452; MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1; supra notes 204-19
and accompanying text.
300. See Cooper, supra note 277, at 337 app. B; MISSOURI CAPITOL POLICE, supra note 286,
at 3-4; supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
301. See Cooper, supra note 277, at 337 app. B.
302. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
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subsection shall be immune from liability in a civil action by the employee or
any other person for any consequences of the disclosure. This immunity shall
not apply if:303
(1) it can be shown by preponderance of the evidence that such response
was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard for whether such response was true or false.304
4. Any employer who receives a proper request made pursuant to subsection 2
of this section from a current or former employee, prospective employer, or
from an entity or person the employer reasonably believes to be a prospective
employer, and the current or former employee engaged in harmful or violent
conduct in the workplace shall, within thirty (30) working days of receipt of
such letter, respond in writing setting forth such information. Such information
must be disclosed if the prospective employer employs personnel in one of the
following categories:305
(1)

school personnel;

(2)

those who in the course of their duties have regular contact with
minors;

(3)

police personnel;

(4)

department of corrections personnel;

(5)

nursing home personnel;

(6)

health care providers;

(7)

day care providers; or

(8)

common carrier personnel.306

Any employer who responds by letter pursuant to this subsection shall be
immune from liability in a civil action by the employee or any other person for
any consequences of the disclosure. This immunity shall not apply if:307
(1) it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that such response
was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard for whether such response was true or false.308

303. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2, -.4; MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.
304. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4; supra notes 229-33, 282-87 and accompanying text.
305. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 290.152.2, 290.140; Long, supra note 179, at 220-21; supra
notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
306. See Long, supra note 179, at 220-21; supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
307. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2-.4.
308. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2.
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5. Any employer found not to be immune pursuant to subsection 3 or
subsection 4 of this section shall be liable for compensatory, but not punitive
damages.309
6. The provisions of this section shall apply regardless of whether the
employee becomes employed by the prospective employer prior to receipt of
the employer’s response.310
7. The employer shall send a copy of any letter provided pursuant to
subsection 3 or subsection 4 of this section, requested by a prospective
employer, to the current or former employee at the employee’s last known
address. The current or former employee may request from the employer a
copy of the letter provided pursuant to subsection 3 or subsection 4 of this
section for up to one year following the date of the letter.311
8. An employer who fails to issue any letter properly requested pursuant to
subsection 2 of this section or fails to issue any copy of such letter properly
requested pursuant to subsection 7 of this section shall be liable for nominal,
compensatory and punitive damages.312
9. A court, in its discretion costs, may award attorneys’ fees and other related
expenses to any party that prevails in any civil proceeding in which a violation
of this section is alleged.313

V. CONCLUSION
The passage of the new Missouri reference immunity statute will be largely
meaningless if both employers and employees are unaware of it.314 Despite the
nearly one hundred year history of the Service Letter Statute in Missouri, at
least one Missouri lobbyist believes very few employers and employees are
actually aware of its existence.315 It is likely the new Missouri statute will
share this fate unless there is an educational campaign to inform employers and
employees of the statute’s passage.316 As employers learn more about the
protection afforded by the new law, their anxieties about providing reference

309. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5; supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
310. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2.
311. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.3.
312. See MO. REV. STAT. 290.140.2; supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
313. See TEX. CODE ANN. ch. 103; supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text.
314. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. Representative Riback Wilson indicated
she has already had several invitations from employer groups to speak about the new statute. See
id.
315. Telephone Interview with St. Louis County Associate Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder,
who prior to assuming the bench lobbied for the new Missouri law on behalf of the Missouri
Association of Trial Attorneys (Oct. 21, 1999).
316. Id.
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information may lessen.317 Alternatively, an employee would have a written
reference to share with prospective employers that accurately reflects the
employee’s job performance.
The new Missouri reference immunity statute is a step toward opening the
channels of communication between employers regarding employee
references. The statute attempts to protect employee interests by requiring that
employees receive a copy of any response made pursuant to the statute.
However, it remains to be seen how Missouri employers, employees, attorneys
and courts will answer some of the questions raised by the statute. What effect
will the new statute have on current law? Will courts read the statute to
expand an employer’s common-law qualified immunity? Will courts simply
rely on traditional principles in deciding cases under the new statute making its
passage largely unnecessary? Will the courts give the statute preclusive effect
as to other available avenues of redress? Will the new statute merely create
another opportunity for litigating employment references in Missouri? Will
Missouri courts imply a duty to warn prospective employers about employees
with dangerous propensities?
The unique features of the new Missouri reference immunity statute show
careful deliberation by lawmakers and lobbyists. Among the most important
features is the attempt to limit the availability of punitive damages in an
employee reference claim. No other state has tried this approach. Yet the
Missouri law places a very high burden on plaintiffs seeking to challenge false,
misleading or defamatory information contained in a reference, while limiting
their available remedies. The new statute attempts to ensure employees will
receive a copy of any reference made pursuant to the statute, but provides no
remedy for a violation of this provision of the law.
Only time will tell if Missouri employers are still damned if they do, and
damned if they don’t.
CATHY A. SCHAINBLATT*

317. See Forster, supra note 10 (citing a statement by Sharon Horrigan, State Legislative
Affairs Manager, Society for Human Resource Management).
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